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In 1982, President Reagan signed into law a statute 
intended to clarify the law regarding the extent of federal courts 
power to enforce U.S. antitrust laws extraterritorially.1 Title IV 
of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, the Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA), has failed at its essential 
purpose. Far from bringing clarity to the law of extraterritorial 
antitrust enforcement, the FTAIA has introduced confusion into 
a regime that, before its enactment, was a modestly successful 
common-law scheme.2 The statutes failings are certainly 
                                                          
 1. See Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, §§ 40103, 
96 Stat. 1233, 124647 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000)) (enacting the Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) of 1982); see also Daniel T. Murphy, Moderating 
Antitrust Subject Matter Jurisdiction: The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act and 
the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Revised), 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 781 (1986) 
(discussing passage of the FTAIA in conjunction with the Export Trading Company Act 
(ETCA)). 
 2. Prior to the FTAIA, extraterritoriality was governed by the effects test, most 
prominently attributed to Judge Hands opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945), superseded by statute, FTAIA of 1982, 
Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, 96 Stat. 1246. See Max Huffman, A Standing Framework for 
Extraterritorial Antitrust, 60 SMU L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 1821, on 
file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925876; see also Conservation 
Council of W. Austl., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 518 F. Supp. 270, 275 (W.D. Pa. 1981) 
(noting that the antitrust laws in 1981 did not give[ ] any clear indication of the scope of 
the extraterritorial jurisdiction conferred and that the determination is left to the 
courts (quoting Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 
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attributable to poor drafting.3 They might also be explained by 
U.S. antitrust courts resistance to engage in traditional 
statutory analysis in the antitrust arena.4 The enactment of the 
FTAIA, then, has had the effect of adding an inelegantly 
phrased5 and opaque6 statute to an area of the law that was 
already confused and unsettled.7 
Despite its shortcomings, the FTAIA is a massively 
important statute.8 It governs activity at the vanguard of private 
                                                          
1979))).  
 3. See 1 SPENCER WEBBER WALLER, ANTITRUST & AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 9:7, 
at 9-10 (3d. ed. 2005) (At a linguistic level, this statute clarifies nothing.); 2 SPENCER WEBBER 
WALLER, ANTITRUST & AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 13:23, at 13-62 (3d ed. 2006) (describing 
the FTAIA as obscure and badly drafted and poorly thought-through); see also ANTITRUST 
MODERNIZATION COMMN, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 225 (2007) [hereinafter AMC 
REPORT], available at http://www.amc.gov/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf 
(The complex wording of [FTAIA], however, has also resulted in ambiguities. The 
territorial scope of the Sherman Act and who may bring a claim under it thus remain 
unclear.). 
 4. See, e.g., United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(declining to interpret the FTAIA in an extraterritoriality case by relying on Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993), which did not place any weight on the FTAIA); 
see also Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 
519, 531 (1983) (noting that Congress intended the [Sherman] Act to be construed in the 
light of its common-law background). 
 5. Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 4. 
 6. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 20 
(Free Press 1993) (1978) (describing the singularly opaque language of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2000), an antitrust statute that shares the FTAIAs poor 
draftsmanship); see also 1 WALLER, supra note 3, § 9:7, at 9-10 to -11 (At a linguistic 
level, [the FTAIA] clarifies nothing.). The opaque language of the FTAIA establishes its 
birthright in the family of the U.S. antitrust laws. The FTAIA reads in full: 
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or 
commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations 
unless 
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable 
effect 
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign 
nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or 
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a 
person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and 
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of 
this title, other than this section. 
If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of the operation 
of paragraph (1)(B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply to such conduct 
only for injury to export business in the United States. 
15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000). 
 7. See Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac VOF (Statoil), 241 F.3d 420, 
42324 (5th Cir. 2001) (describing the complexity of the case law surrounding the 
Sherman Act); see also Turicentro v. Am. Airlines, 303 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing 
Statoil, 241 F.3d at 42931 (The history of this body of case law is confusing and 
unsettled.)).  
 8. See 1 WALLER, supra note 3, § 9:7, at 9-12; see also AMC REPORT, supra note 3, 
at 225 (The importance of clarity in this area has grown in recent years.). 
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efforts to achieve compensation for alleged anticompetitive 
activity, in which domestic class-action lawyers look overseas to 
increase their client base, and foreign plaintiffs themselves look 
overseas at plaintiff-friendly procedures and substantive legal 
rules uniquely available under the U.S. antitrust scheme.9 As 
Judge Wood wrote in 2001, [t]he volume of international 
transactions has exploded; old political barriers to trade and 
commerce have fallen; and the world of cyberspace is quickly 
erasing what is left of national boundaries for economic 
purposes.10 Belying much-exaggerated reports of the death of 
antitrust,11 the litigation boom in the antitrust 
extraterritoriality arena boasts scores of suits filed in the past 
decade, many consolidated into massive multi-district litigation 
proceedings, together seeking billions of dollars in damages, pre-
trebling, for harms allegedly suffered by members of world-wide 
plaintiff classes.12 Judicial and legislative practices in 
                                                          
 9. As Professor Waller notes, the FTAIA was intended to limit the rights of 
foreign plaintiffs generally under United States antitrust laws. See 1 WALLER, supra 
note 3, § 9:9, at 9-34. The U.S. system is fraught with advantages that make U.S. courts 
attractive places to vindicate harms suffered elsewhere on the globe. See Huffman, supra 
note 2 (manuscript at 1) (listing various factors that have combined to bring foreign 
plaintiffs in ever-increasing numbers into U.S. courts). The U.S. system promises jury 
trials, wide-ranging pretrial discovery without judicial supervision, . . . extraterritorial 
discovery, treble damages, class actions, [and] contingent fees. Joseph P. Griffin, Foreign 
Governmental Reactions to U.S. Assertions of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 6 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 505, 516 (1998). These features combine, according to a justice department 
official, to create a multi-color brochure for international antitrust tourism that will 
surely beindeed, already isirresistible to many foreign plaintiffs. Makan Delrahim, 
Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Remarks at the American Bar Association Section of 
Antitrust Law Fall Forum: Department of Justice Perspectives on International Antitrust 
Enforcement: Recent Legal Developments and Policy Implications 17 (Nov. 18, 2003), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/201509.pdf; see also Donald B. 
Houston & Jeanne L. Pratt, Jurisdictional Issues in International Cartel Cases: A 
Canadian Perspective, 19 INTL L. PRACTICUM 21, 25 (2006) (noting that the prospect of 
treble damages under U.S. law is very attractive to plaintiffs in Canada and in other 
parts of the world). 
 10. Diane P. Wood, Foreword to MARK R. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 
PRIMER, at xi, xi (2d ed. 2001). 
 11. See Adam J. Pernsteiner, Speaking Volumes, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov./Dec. 2004, at 
9, 9 (reviewing and quoting ELIOT G. DISNER, ANTITRUST LAW FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS: 
QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, LAW, AND COMMENTARY 1 (2d ed. 2003) (The reports of the death 
of antirust law some time ago were premature.)). 
 12. See, e.g., In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 452 F. Supp. 2d 555, 
56164 (D. Del. 2006) (dismissing an antitrust case for failure to show more than a ripple 
effect in the United States despite the plaintiffs allegations of competitive injury, both 
in U.S. commerce and throughout the world-wide market of which the U.S. portion is but 
an indivisible part); In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig., Nos. C 02-
1486 PJH, C 05-3026 PJH, 2006 WL 515629, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2006) (alleging an 
international price-fixing conspiracy in computer memory); CSR Ltd. v. Cigna Corp., 405 
F. Supp. 2d 526, 548 (D.N.J. 2005) (suing foreign insurers who refused to write new 
insurance contracts or renew older contracts); In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust 
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interpreting and amending the antitrust laws also elevate the 
importance of the FTAIA; the slow pace of amendments to the 
federal antitrust scheme, driven partly by antitrust courts 
experience in advancing doctrine through common-law analysis 
rather than statutory interpretation, means that even a poorly 
conceived and drafted statute can remain on the books ad 
infinitum.13 
This Article considers the twenty-five years since the 
FTAIAs enactment in 1982. In Part II, the Article describes the 
statutes history, including the preceding common-law 
development that Congress explicitly approved and largely 
adopted in the FTAIA. Part III discusses the FTAIAs language 
in depth, concentrating on the particular interpretive issues that 
have arisen, and the surprisingly important and difficult 
procedural questions presented by the statute. In Part IV, the 
Article explores areas in need of judicial clarification if the 
statute remains in its present form, as well as the involvement of 
the Antitrust Modernization Commission geared toward 
interpreting, and possibly recommending amendments to, the 
FTAIA. 
II. HISTORY OF THE FTAIA 
A. The Common Law of Antitrust Extraterritoriality 
1. Early Cases. Modern-day rules governing 
extraterritorial enforcement are the result of nearly a century of 
                                                          
Litig., No. Civ. 00MDL1328, 2005 WL 2810682, at *1 (D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2005) (claiming, 
on behalf of a worldwide class, that defendants engaged in a global price-fixing scheme), 
affd, 477 F.3d 535 (8th Cir. 2007); Latino QuimicaAmtex v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., 
No. 03 Civ. 10312(HBDF), 2005 WL 2207017, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2005) (recognizing 
the plaintiffsMexican, Argentinean and Colombian purchasers of chemicalsallegation 
of a global price-fixing scheme). Improved methods of detection, as well as increased 
global awareness of the harms of anticompetitive conduct, have led enforcers to prosecute 
vigorously global price-fixing conspiracies that affect world-wide commerce. AMC 
REPORT, supra note 3, at 225 (noting, as well, the increase in private treble-damages 
actions). 
 13. See JOELSON, supra note 10, at 36 (noting that development of the law 
governing antitrust extraterritoriality has occurred largely through the judicial process). 
For example, despite near universal condemnation, the RobinsonPatman Act, an 
antitrust law, remains in force. See, e.g., Paul H. LaRue, RobinsonPatman Act in the 
Twenty-First Century: Will the Morton Salt Rule be Retired?, 48 SMU L. REV. 1917, 1917 
(2005) ([T]he Act has been the object of unrelenting criticism by legal scholars and 
economists.). This act has also produced two Supreme Court opinions in the past 
fourteen years. See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. ReederSimco GMC, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 860, 
866, 87273 (2006) (examining the RobinsonPatman Act); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Co., 509 U.S. 209, 220 (1993) (applying the RobinsonPatman Act). 
But see AMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 20, 312, 317 (Congress should repeal the 
RobinsonPatman Act in its entirety.). 
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development of the doctrine, beginning with Justice Holmess 
1909 opinion in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.14 In 
American Banana, a case Judge Becker has characterized by its 
byzantine facts,15 a U.S. company was alleged to have monopoly 
power in growing and exporting bananas from the United States 
of Columbia, in a region that comprises modern-day Panama, 
Costa Rica, and Colombia.16 
The plaintiff, also a U.S. company, had purchased 
plantations from another owner, and, allegedly, the defendant 
requestedfor anticompetitive purposesthe Costa Rican 
military to seize the plaintiffs plantations and the railroad used 
to transport bananas for export.17 The plaintiff believed the 
defendant was liable either for causing the Costa Rican 
government to engage in conduct toward plaintiff that harmed 
competition or for conspiring with the Costa Rican government.18 
Relying on the general and almost universal rule . . . that 
the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined 
wholly by the law of the country where the act is done, Justice 
Holmes held that the plaintiffs claims were not cognizable in a 
U.S. antitrust court.19 Exceptions to the principle that a sovereign 
                                                          
 14. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). But see Contl Ore. Co. 
v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 70405 (1962) (noting that American 
Banana has been substantially overruled by subsequent Court decisions). American 
Banana was [t]he first Supreme Court case involving the extraterritoriality of the U.S. 
antitrust laws. JOELSON, supra note 10, at 37. 
 15. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1180 
(E.D. Pa. 1980). 
 16. Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 354. At the time of the allegedly anticompetitive 
conduct, the region was in the process of separating into independent states. See id. at 
35455 (describing events occurring between 1899 and 1905); see also U.S. Dept of State, 
Background Note: Colombia, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm (describing the 
War of a Thousand Days between 1899 and 1903) (last visited Apr. 14, 2007); U.S. Dept 
of State, Background Note: Panama, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2030.htm (dating 
Panamas independence from Spain at 1903) (last visited Apr. 14, 2007). 
 17. See Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 35455. The plaintiff alleged other conduct as well: 
raiding of plaintiffs human capital, outbidding competitors for sales, and coercing its own 
employees not to own stock in plaintiff. Id. at 355. But the primary concern was the 
military takeover of plaintiffs property. See id. at 355. Plaintiffs allegations were slightly 
more involved than detailed here. In part, plaintiff alleged that Astua, a third party, won 
a judgment in a Costa Rican court declaring that plaintiffs property belonged to Astua; 
allegedly, agents of the defendant then purchased the property from Austa. Id. Somewhat 
ironically, in its allegations in U.S. court, the plaintiff relied in part on the Costa Rican 
courts lack of territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue of the ownership of the 
property. Id. 
 18. Id. at 355. 
 19. Id. at 356, 359. See generally HENDRIK ZWARENSTEYN, SOME ASPECTS OF THE 
EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS 94 (1970) (citing H. DONNEDIEU DE 
VABRES, LES PRINCIPES MODERNES DU DROIT PENAL INTERNATIONAL 32, 33 (1928); A. 
Mulder, De Extra-territoriale Werking Van Het Strafrecht, 51 MEDEDDINGEN VAN DE 
NEDERLANDSE VERENIGING VOOR INTERNATIONAAL RECHT 14 (1964)). 
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has authority over conduct by its citizens in regions subject to no 
sovereign, like the high seas or in acts of piracy, did not apply to 
actors subject to the laws of a foreign government.20 Instead, not 
only were the acts of the defendant in Panama or Costa Rica not 
within the Sherman Act, but they were not torts by the law of the 
place and therefore were not torts at all.21 American Banana was 
an easy case. Properly understood, it is not an antitrust 
extraterritoriality case at all, but an early application of the Act 
of State doctrine, under which U.S. courts will not exercise 
jurisdiction over acts by a foreign sovereign.22 Justice Holmes 
explicitly noted, [t]he injuries to the plantation and supplies 
seem to have been the direct effect of the acts of the Costa Rican 
                                                          
 20. Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 35556; see also United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 
1121, 1133 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ([H]ijacking crimes are subject to universal 
jurisdiction . . . .). Justice Holmess use of the piracy example typifies the operation of the 
doctrine of universal jurisdiction. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987) (A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment 
for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such 
as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and 
perhaps certain acts of terrorism . . . .). Universal jurisdiction has never been recognized 
for antitrust offenses. See F. HoffmannLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 165 
(2004) (discussing the limitations of Americas jurisdictional reach with regard to 
anticompetitive behavior that injures foreign, rather than domestic, parties). 
 21. Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 357. One commentator argued that the American 
Banana rule was justified by the civil tort nature of the proceeding, as opposed to some 
rule broadly applicable to the U.S. antitrust scheme. ZWARENSTEYN, supra note 19, at 
12425. The better view of American Banana seems to be that the conduct test held sway 
in the first half of the twentieth century, and the effects test came to be dominant in the 
second half. See infra notes 3738 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Contl Ore Co. v. 
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 70406 (1962) (affirming the rule from 
Alcoa that the effect of foreign conduct is determinative). 
 22. 1B HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 274, at 366 (3d ed. 2006); see also 
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1976), superseded by 
statute, FTAIA of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, 96 Stat. 1246 (From the beginning, 
this [act of state] principle has been applied in foreign trade antitrust cases. (citing Am. 
Banana, 213 U.S. 347; Occidental Petrol. Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 
(C.D. Cal. 1971), affd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972))); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1181 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (noting that the intimate 
involvement of instrumentalities of foreign sovereigns [in American Banana] implicat[es] 
the act of state doctrine and that [m]any courts have distinguished American Banana on 
act of state grounds (citing Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977))). 
  On the act of state doctrine generally, see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 
376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) (The act of state doctrine in its traditional formulation 
precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a 
recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory.); Underhill v. 
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (Every sovereign State is bound to respect the 
independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in 
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.); O.N.E. 
Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 830 F.2d 449, 453 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(positing that the act of state doctrine is applicable in a case in which the conduct of the 
appellees has been compelled by the foreign government). 
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government.23 But the rule announced was broader than the 
facts would seem to require.24 In closing, the opinion announced 
the rule that [a] conspiracy in this country to do acts in another 
jurisdiction does not draw to itself those acts and make them 
unlawful, if they are permitted by the local law.25 American 
Banana generally is understood to have expressed a broad no 
extraterritorial[ity] principle applicable to antitrust claims.26 
Such apparent aversion to extraterritorial application of the 
U.S. antitrust laws did not last long.27 In the 1911 case of United 
States v. American Tobacco Co., both U.S. and British defendants 
were liable under U.S. law for a worldwide market-division 
agreement.28 And eighteen years after American Banana, in 
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., the Court reversed a holding 
by the Southern District of New York that had relied on 
American Banana to dismiss allegations that defendants 
attempted to monopolize the market for importing sisal, a fiber 
from plants grown on the Yucatan peninsula in Mexico and used 
                                                          
 23. Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 359; cf. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288 
(1952) (This court agreed[, in American Banana,] that a violation of American laws could 
not be grounded on a foreign nations sovereign acts.); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 
274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927) (relying on American Banana for the proposition that a seizure 
by a state is not a thing that can be complained of elsewhere in the courts (quoting Am. 
Banana, 213 U.S. at 35758)). But see W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 
493 U.S. 400, 40708 (1990) (Simply put, American Banana was not an act of state 
case . . . .). 
 24. See JOELSON, supra note 10, at 38 (noting that the Court could have relied on 
the grounds that no substantial anticompetitive effect on U.S. foreign commerce had been 
established and that, moreover, a foreign government could not be challenged for acts it 
undertook within its own territory). 
 25. Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 359. 
 26. See W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 407; see also McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 
107, 119 n.8 (1st Cir. 2005) (An older and now discredited view, reflected [in American 
Banana], was that antitrust laws were wholly territorial in nature.); United 
Phosphorous, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) 
(referring to American Bananas strict territorial test); United States v. Nippon Paper 
Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997) (interpreting Judge Hands opinion in Alcoa as 
construing American Banana narrowlyonly to circumstances of extraterritorial conduct 
with no effect in the United States). According to Judge Becker, the Supreme Court, in 
United States v. Pacific & Arctic Railway & Naval Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106 (1913), seemed 
to imply that it could assert no jurisdiction over foreign corporations operating abroad: If 
we may not control foreign citizens or corporations operating in foreign territory, we 
certainly may control such citizens and corporations operating in our territory . . . . 
Matsushita, 494 F. Supp. at 1182 (omission in original) (quoting Pac. & Arctic Ry. & 
Naval Co., 228 U.S. at 106). 
 27. See Matsushita, 494 F. Supp. at 1181 (American Banana has never been 
explicitly overruled. However, its authority has been so eroded by subsequent case law as 
to have been effectively limited to its specific factual pattern.); Dominicus Americana 
Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (There is now 
broad agreement that [American Bananas] holding on the issue of [extraterritorial] 
jurisdiction is obsolete.). 
 28. United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 17581 (1911). 
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in making agricultural twine.29 In one important respect, the 
Sisal facts are nearly identical to the essential facts of American 
Bananain Sisal, like American Banana, the defendants had 
gained the help of the foreign sovereign (Mexico) in establishing 
their monopoly position.30 
But Sisal remains distinguishable from American Banana.31 
In American Banana, the conductmonopolization of the 
production and transportation of bananaswas confined to the 
geographic territories of Panama and Costa Rica.32 In Sisal, the 
government alleged conspiratorial activity in the United States.33 
And, where American Banana was limited to foreign production 
and transportation, the allegations in Sisal included interference 
with imports and domestic trade and extraterritorial conduct 
serving that ultimate end.34 In 1927, then, the crux of the 
                                                          
 29. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 27172, 276 (1927). Other 
cases have been cited as the earliest examples of the Supreme Courts recognition of U.S. 
courts power over foreign conduct with domestic effects. See, e.g., Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 
U.S. 66 (1917) (addressing allegations of restraint of transportation between New York 
and South Africa). A case like Thomsen is easily within U.S. courts adjudicative power 
based on the explicit reach in the Sherman Act of commerce . . . with foreign nations. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); see also United States v. Pac. & Arctic Ry. & Naval Co., 228 U.S. 
87, 88 (examining the monopolization of transportation routes between U.S. and 
Canadian ports); cf. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 148 (involving foreign defendants as co-
conspirators with U.S. defendants). The lesson to be learned from these early Supreme 
Court cases is that the broad language of American Banana, implying that the United 
States could never assert jurisdiction over acts occurring abroad, is not to be construed as 
controlling . . . . Matsushita, 494 F. Supp. at 1183. 
 30. Compare Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. at 273 (noting that the Mexican and 
Yucatanian governments were persuaded to pass discriminatory legislation), with Am. 
Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 35455 (stating that the Costa Rican government used its 
military to take property from plaintiff, a competitor of the defendant). An obvious 
distinction between the two uses of sovereign power is that, in Sisal, the conducthad it 
occurred in the U.S. in recent yearswould be protected under the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine and the Petition Clause of the First Amendment. See Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. 
Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 123839 (Similarly, the Court 
has recognized, through the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, that the Petition Clause of the 
First Amendment exempts from antitrust liability sincere attempts of private actors to 
petition government to crush their competitors. (footnote omitted)). That distinction was 
not relevant when the court decided Sisal in 1927. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. at 268. 
 31. See Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. at 275 (distinguishing American Bananas 
radically different fact pattern); 1B HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, ¶ 274, at 36667 
(noting how Sisal is distinguishable from American Banana). 
 32. See Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 357. 
 33. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. at 276. 
 34. See id.; Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 35455 (discussing the plaintiffs loss of the 
plantation and the railroad used for transporting the produce); see also Contl Ore Co. v. 
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962) (citing Sisal to support the 
proposition that the mere fact some conduct occurs overseas does not remove a conspiracy 
from the reach of the U.S. antitrust laws); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288
89 (1952) (distinguishing Sisal from American Banana because in Sisal, it was the 
defendants own acts that caused the complained-of harm, rather than the acts of a 
foreign sovereign as in American Banana). 
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extraterritoriality question might be said to have been a conduct 
test. U.S. courts could extend their power to hear antitrust cases 
if any of the alleged conduct occurred in the United States.35 But 
U.S. antitrust courts should stay their hands if the conduct 
alleged was wholly extraterritorial.36 
2. Alcoa and the Effects Test. Under the conduct analysis 
found at the junction between American Banana and Sisal, 
Judge Learned Hands Aluminum Co. of America v. United States 
(Alcoa) opinion reflects a dramatic departure and change of 
emphasis.37 Most prominently, since Alcoa, it has been relatively 
clear that it is the situs of the effects as opposed to the conduct, 
that determines whether U.S. antitrust law applies.38 
a. Alcoa. In 1945, sitting as a court of last resort due to a 
procedural quirk brought about by four recusals on the Supreme 
Court, the Second Circuit crafted the effects test to define the 
appropriate extent of U.S. antitrust courts extraterritorial 
                                                          
  Both conduct and effects are well-grounded bases for the exercise of jurisdiction 
by a State. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (listing 
locus of regulated conduct, locus of harm, and identity of the actor as bases on which a 
state may exert jurisdiction). 
 35. See Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. at 276 (evaluating the conduct of the companies, 
through their deliberate acts, which sought to enter into a conspiracy); see also O.N.E. 
Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 830 F.2d 449, 453 n.4 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(reading Sisal and Continental Ore as applying a conduct standard); In re Uranium 
Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1253 (7th Cir. 1980) (treating Sisal as announcing a 
conduct standard); Linseman v. World Hockey Assn, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1324 (D. Conn. 
1977) (relying on Sisal to conclude that the act of state doctrine is not a defense to conduct 
occurring in the United States). 
 36. See Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 357. 
 37. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 
1945), superseded by statute, FTAIA of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, 96 Stat. 1246 
([A]ny state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for 
conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state 
reprehends . . . .). Modern extraterritoriality analyses do not treat foreign government 
involvement as anathema to U.S. courts adjudicating cases. Compare Timberlane Lumber 
Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1976), superseded by statute, FTAIA of 
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, 96 Stat. 1246 (Even if the coup de grace to Timberlanes 
enterprises in Honduras was applied by official authorities, we do not agree that the 
doctrine necessarily shelters these defendants or requires dismissal of the [plaintiffs] 
action.), with Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 35759 (dismissing the case because of 
involvement of the Costa Rican military and acquiescence of the foreign government in 
the allegedly anticompetitive acts). According to the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane, 
subsequent cases have limited American Banana to its particular facts. Timberlane, 549 
F.2d at 609. 
 38. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 5 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2490; 
see also Kruman v. Christies Intl PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that 
Alcoa makes clear effects, not conduct, is the appropriate inquiry), abrogated by F. 
HoffmannLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
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reach.39 In Alcoa, Judge Learned Hand wrote one of the most 
influential antitrust cases on the books.40 He announced a rule of 
extraterritoriality that resonates to the modern day in antitrust 
and other substantive areas of the law.41 
Alcoa, a U.S. company, and its Canadian sister company 
Aluminum Limited, were alleged to have agreed with foreign 
producers of aluminum to form an international cartel for the 
purpose of fixing prices.42 The question was whether the 
Canadian sibling, Aluminum Limited, violated section 1 of the 
Sherman Act43 by agreeing in 1931 with a French corporation, 
two German, one Swiss, [and] a British to form a Swiss 
corporation called the Alliance.44 The Alliance issued shares to 
                                                          
 39. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 421, 444 (stating that because there was no quorum of six 
Supreme Court justices to hear the case, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1946) authorized the appellate 
court to decide the case and going on to define the effects tests); see also 15 U.S.C. § 29 
(1946) (recodified at 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2000)) (authorizing lower courts to hear cases in 
which a quorum of the Supreme Court is not available in lieu of a decision by the 
Supreme Court); Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946) (stating that 
the unique circumstances of Alcoa add to its weight as precedent); JOELSON, supra note 
10, at 38 (stating that Judge Hand was one of the countrys greatest jurists). 
  The effects test is not unique to antitrust extraterritoriality. Judge Wilkey, in 
Laker Airways, analogized the effects test to the traditional example of this 
principle[]transnational homicide: when a malefactor in State A shoots a victim 
across the border in State B, State B can proscribe the harmful conduct. Laker 
Airways Ltd., 731 F.2d at 922 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 18, illus. 2 (1965)). 
 40. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416; see also Steven L. Snell, Controlling Restrictive Business 
Practices in Global Markets: Reflection on the Concepts of Sovereignty, Fairness, and 
Comity, 33 STAN. J. INTL L. 215, 247 (1997) (Alcoa remained an influential decision for 
three decades . . . .). But see Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust 
Laws: The United States and European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INTL L. 1, 9 
(1992) ([Alcoa] was frequently criticized by foreign governments and scholars for its 
failure to consider international comity concerns and the potential interference with 
foreign sovereignty interests.). The opinion is also, in one respect, perhaps the most 
vilified opinion in the body of U.S. antitrust law, holding that monopoly power, however 
gained, is a violation of the Sherman Act. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 43132. On this holding, 
Alcoa has been overruled. See, e.g., Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 
F.2d 370, 37576 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting the overruling and stating that a company with a 
lawful monopoly power has no affirmative duty to, and no liability for failing to, assist its 
competitors and no liability under the Sherman Act). 
 41. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 44344 (setting out the power of states to reach 
extraterritorial actions that have an effect on domestic markets); see also U.S. DEPT OF 
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMMN, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR 
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS § 3.1 & n.51 (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
atr/public/guidelines/internat.htm (reciting the Alcoa effects test [w]ith respect to 
foreign import commerce, and a variant, the direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect[s] test from the FTAIA with respect to foreign commerce other than 
imports). 
 42. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 42122. 
 43. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
 44. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 442. 
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each member and fixed a quota of production for each share.45 
Each member of the Alliance was required to produce only at the 
level of the quota multiplied by the number of shares allotted to 
that member.46 The court easily concludedand a court certainly 
would conclude todaythat the output reduction agreements 
would clearly have been unlawful, had they been made within 
the United States.47 
But whether the agreement among the foreign companies 
violated U.S. antitrust law was a question of whether Congress 
chose to attach liability to the conduct outside the United States 
of persons not in allegiance to it.48 Alcoa represents a shift in the 
thinking about extraterritoriality. Unlike American Banana and 
Sisal, in which the Court judged its power to hear a claim under 
the antitrust laws by whether the conduct was illegal in the 
foreign jurisdiction,49 in Alcoa, a U.S. courts power under the 
U.S. antitrust laws was held to be a question of Congresss 
intent, or lack thereof, to reach the extraterritorial conduct with 
its laws.50 
Judge Hand announced a two-part test for antitrust 
extraterritoriality.51 Overseas conspiracies properly were the 
subject of suit in a U.S. antitrust court if they were intended to 
                                                          
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. In 1936, the cartel changed its system for allotting production quotas among 
its members; members that exceeded their prescribed quotas paid royalties to the 
Alliance, which were divided among the shareholders. Id. at 443. The Alliance continued 
in operation at least until World War II, when the German shareholders of course 
became enemies of the French, British and Canadian shareholders in 1939. Id. 
 47. Id. at 444; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); Cal. Dental Assn v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 
773 (1999) (finding agreements to reduce output per se illegal); Alford, supra note 40, at 9 
(suggesting courts would concur today by noting the test proposed in Alcoa has rapidly 
gained acceptance in the United States). 
 48. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443; see also F. HoffmannLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 
U.S. 155, 158 (2004) (focusing on conduct, in significant part foreign, that causes some 
domestic antitrust injury, and that independently causes separate foreign injury). 
 49. See United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 27576 (1927) 
(distinguishing the facts from those of American Banana); Am. Banana Co. v. United 
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (concluding implicitly that a U.S. court could have the 
power to entertain claims of violations of foreign law). 
 50. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443; cf. JOELSON, supra note 10, at 38 (labeling the effects 
test the objective territorial principle and the conduct test the limited territorial 
principle). 
  If American Banana reflects the conduct view of extraterritoriality, and Alcoa 
the effects view, a third view also exists: U.S. courts generally have been comfortable 
asserting jurisdiction over conduct by U.S. citizens abroad. See Steele v. Bulova Watch 
Co., 344 U.S. 280, 28586 (1952) (discussing the U.S. right to regulate citizens conduct on 
foreign soil when the rights of other nations . . . are not infringed by the assertion of 
regulatory authority). 
 51. Alcoa, 148 F.2d. at 444. 
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affect imports and did affect them.52 The conjunctive nature of 
this test indicates that it required both elements.53 Courts have 
emphasized the importance of the intent requirement in Alcoa. 
According to the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank 
of America, the intent element provides room for flexibility in the 
degree of effect required for jurisdiction.54 Additionally, the Third 
Circuit, in its 1979 Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. 
opinion, referred to the Alcoa test as a wide-reaching intended 
effects test.55 
b. Subsequent Refinement of the Effects Test. Alcoa 
stated the effects test but did little to define its operation.56 The 
effects test was refined over the thirty-seven years before the 
FTAIA was enacted, but during that process, confusion arose 
about its meaning and application.57 The effects test also escaped 
the confines of the law of antitrust and was applied in other 
schemes, including securities litigation58 and trademark 
litigation.59 Judge Becker observed that the extraterritoriality 
                                                          
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.; see also ZWARENSTEYN, supra note 19, at 119. 
 54. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 1976), 
superseded by statute, FTAIA of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, 96 Stat. 1246 (The 
intent requirement suggested by Alcoa . . . is one example of an attempt to broaden the 
courts perspective . . . .). 
 55. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1979); 
see also In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1253 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting the 
intended effects test). 
 56. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444. 
 57. In Continental Ore, the Supreme Court affirmed Alcoas holding that foreign 
conduct could be challenged in a U.S. court based on effects in domestic commerce. Contl 
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 70405 (1962), superseded by 
statute, FTAIA of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, 96 Stat. 1246. In Continental Ore, a 
U.S. company sued U.S. and Canadian defendants claiming exclusionary conduct. Id. at 
69293. The lower court directed a verdict for the defendants because the plaintiffs right 
to compete in the Canadian market was within the authority of the Canadian 
government. Id. at 703. The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting reliance on the American 
Banana rule in favor of a more liberal extraterritoriality standard that emphasized the 
occurrence of conduct in the United States. Id. at 704. 
 58. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 98889 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(applying Judge Hands effects test from Alcoa in holding that subject matter jurisdiction 
is available only when the fraudulent acts, relating to securities and committed abroad, 
result in injury to purchasers or sellers of those securities in whom the United States has 
an interest); see also Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 61012 (noting the analog between 
extraterritoriality in the securities arena and in the antitrust arena). 
 59. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 28587 (1952) (looking to the 
effects of defendants foreign operations within the United States on the question of 
trademark infringement committed in a foreign country); see also McBee v. Delica Co., 
417 F.3d 107, 12021 (1st Cir. 2005) (The substantial effects test requires that there be 
evidence of impacts within the United States, and these impacts must be of a sufficient 
character and magnitude to give the United States a reasonably strong interest in the 
litigation.); Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop. Assn, 701 F.2d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 
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question has been most frequently litigated in the context of the 
Sherman Act, but also recognized courts grappling in the 
securities and trademark schemes.60 In those other arenas, the 
effects test today retains vitality perhaps to a degree surpassing 
antitrust, because the FTAIA applies only to antitrust.61 
3. Procedural Conflict over Comity Considerations. In the 
late 1970s, in Timberlane and Mannington Mills, the Ninth and 
Third Circuits introduced a substantial refinement to the effects 
test.62 Both courts held that before a U.S. court heard an 
antitrust claim involving foreign conduct, the court must balance 
the interests of the United States in having the claim heard in its 
courts against the international comity ramifications of doing 
so.63 Both rules required courts to consider questions of the extent 
of conflict with foreign law, the nationality of the parties, the 
extent to which the foreign state is a superior enforcer, the 
comparative significance of the effects in one nation versus the 
other, the foreseeability of an effect on U.S. commerce, and the 
comparative importance of the policies to be vindicated in the 
respective countries.64 The Third Circuit, in Mannington Mills, 
added the following to the Ninth Circuits Timberlane factors: the 
effect on foreign relations if the U.S. court hears the case, the 
possibility or impossibility of making the order effective, and the 
existence of a treaty between the United States and the affected 
nation speaking to the question.65 
                                                          
1983) (analyzing Timberlane, Mannington Mills, and Uranium Antitrust in a case 
involving extraterritorial application of the trademark laws); Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d 
at 1292 (relying on Steele to understand the rationale for the reach of the Alcoa test). 
Although McBee was decided many years after the FTAIA was enacted, because the 
FTAIA does not apply to trademark claims, the case is still instructive as to the operation 
of the Alcoa effects test. McBee, 417 F.3d at 12022. 
 60. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1178 & 
n.33, 1185 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
 61. See 2 WALLER, supra note 3, § 13:23, at 13-61 (stating that the FTAIA limits 
U.S. jurisdiction of antitrust violations to those occurring in or effecting the United 
States). 
 62. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d 1287; Timberlane, 549 F.2d 597; see also El Cid, 
Ltd. v. N.J. Zinc Co., 551 F. Supp. 626, 629 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting the approach of 
treating comity considerations as part of the extraterritoriality analysis and citing 
Timberlane and Mannington Mills); Pierre Vogelenzang, Note, Foreign Sovereign 
Compulsion in American Antitrust Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 131, 133 (1980) (recognizing an 
awareness . . . that courts should weigh foreign regulatory interests . . . when deciding 
whether to give extraterritorial effect to American antitrust law). 
 63. See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 129798 (adopting and refining Timberlanes 
balancing approach); Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613 (making clear that the United States 
interests must be sufficiently strong as compared to other nations interests in order to 
justify assertion of extraterritorial authority). 
 64. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 129798; Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 61314. 
 65. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 129798; see also JOELSON, supra note 10, at 39 
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Although both courts employed a fact-based inquiry that 
commentators have analogized to the rule of reason inquiry in 
substantive antitrust law,66 the two circuits differed in the 
                                                          
(Mannington Mills . . . somewhat alter[ed] the list of factors to be weighed.). 
  Those factors, of course, are not cut from whole cloth. They owe their derivation 
to common-law analysis of foreign relations considerations, which are reflected in the 
Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, section 403 of which reads, in pertinent part: 
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is 
determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate: 
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the 
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has 
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory; 
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, 
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the 
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the 
regulation is designed to protect; 
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation 
to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such 
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is 
generally accepted; 
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by 
the regulation; 
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or 
economic system; 
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the 
international system; 
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the 
activity; and 
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987). The Third Restatement 
speaks in terms of the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction but notes in the 
commentary that courts have applied the principle of reasonableness as a requirement of 
comity. Id. § 403 cmt. a; see also KINGMAN BREWSTER, JR., ANTITRUST & AMERICAN 
BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958) (listing six factors: the comparative significance of U.S. 
conduct to foreign conduct; the intent of the defendant regarding U.S. commerce; 
comparative seriousness of domestic versus foreign effects; the nationality of the parties; 
the degree of conflict with foreign laws; and the extent to which conflict can be 
avoided). 
  Section 403 and its predecessor, section 18, have been cited and discussed 
regularly by courts engaging in the antitrust extraterritoriality analysis, both before and 
after the enactment of the FTAIA. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 610 & n.18 (citing and 
discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 18 (1965)); see also F. 
HoffmannLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 16465 (2004) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1986)); Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993) (same); United States v. Nippon Paper 
Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997) (same); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 
909, 92123 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW § 18 (1965) and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (Tentative 
Draft No.2, 1981)). See generally Joseph Jude Norton, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of U.S. 
Antitrust and Securities Laws, 28 INTL & COMP. L.Q. 575, 597 (1979) (advocating the 
approach of international comity as codified in the Restatement). 
 66. Timberlane has been read to have created a jurisdictional rule of reason. In re 
Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980) (quoting BREWSTER, JR., 
supra note 65, at 446). 
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procedural framework they adopted.67 Under the Timberlane 
rule, the comity analysis was best treated as part of the subject 
matter jurisdiction inquiry.68 That court emphasized the 
jurisdictional implications of the extraterritoriality analysis.69 
By contrast, in what Judge Becker later called a tidy 
framework, easily workable in practice,70 the Third Circuit held, 
in Mannington Mills, that considerations of comity and possible 
repercussions were best addressed as part of a prudential 
standing inquiry into whether a court should exercise jurisdiction 
it already possessed.71 That court easily concluded to its 
satisfaction that the district court did have jurisdiction in this 
case,72 relying on the rule from Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine 
Research, Inc. that when two American litigants are contesting 
alleged antitrust activity abroad that results in harm to the 
export business of one, a federal court does have subject matter 
jurisdiction.73 The court then turned (after analyzing the act of 
state doctrine) to the question of whether the district court 
should exercise jurisdiction.74  
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit applied the Mannington Mills 
procedural framework and upheld the district courts In re 
                                                          
 67. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1188 
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (The Third Circuit adopted [the Ninth Circuit]s approach in large part, 
albeit with a different analytical framework . . . .). 
 68. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613; see also Matsushita, 494 F. Supp. at 118788 
(describing the Timberlanes comity analysis as part of the jurisdictional question). 
 69. See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1301 (Adams, J., concurring) (arguing 
Timberlane stated a comity analysis as part of the subject matter jurisdiction inquiry); 
Conservation Council of W. Austl., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 518 F. Supp. 270, 27475 
(W.D. Pa. 1981) (interpreting Timberlane to require the comity analysis as part of the 
jurisdictional analysis). Contra Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884 
n.7 (5th Cir. 1982) (Like the Third Circuit majority [in Mannington Mills] and the 
Seventh Circuit [in Uranium Antitrust], however, we do not read the Timberlane 
balancing test as a test of subject matter jurisdiction.); Uranium Antitrust, 617 F.2d at 
1255 (interpreting Timberlane as treating the comity consideration as discretionary, to be 
applied if jurisdiction is found). 
 70. Matsushita, 494 F. Supp. at 1188 n.63. 
 71. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1294; see also Matsushita, 494 F. Supp. at 1188 
& n.63 (noting that Mannington Mills required considerations of comity and international 
repercussions as part of a abstention-style inquiry, rather than in the subject matter 
jurisdiction inquiry). Compare McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 111 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(favoring the rule that considerations of comity are best considered as part of the standing 
inquiry, not a subject matter jurisdiction inquiry), with Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
California, 509 U.S. 764, 79899 (1993) (stating that the standing inquiry requires a court 
to determine whether to exercise jurisdiction that it possesses). See generally Huffman, 
supra note 2 (manuscript at 2931) (casting comity in the light of prudential standing 
inquiry). 
 72. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1292. 
 73. Id. (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969)). 
 74. Id. at 1294. 
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Uranium Antitrust Litigation75 decision by employing the effects 
test to find jurisdiction, but considering comity to decide whether 
to exercise that jurisdiction.76 Mannington Mills and Uranium 
Antitrust anticipated the Supreme Courts approach in Hartford 
Fire Insurance Co. v. California, where the Court noted 
situations may arise in which international comity would favor a 
court declining to exercise jurisdiction.77 
Adding its voice to the choir, in Industrial Investment 
Development Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., the Fifth Circuit approved 
comity considerations as part of the extraterritoriality analysis, 
but introduced further confusion on the procedural basis for the 
comity consideration.78 That court rejected the Timberlane courts 
approach to treating comity as a matter of a courts subject 
matter jurisdiction. The wide-ranging inquiry suggested by 
Timberlane and its progeny does not fit within Bells approach to 
subject matter jurisdiction.79 But neither did the Industrial 
Investment Development court approve a prudential standing 
inquiry. It rejected the Seventh Circuits approach in Uranium 
Antitrust because it disagreed that discretion was inherent in the 
comity analysis.80 
The procedural differences in approaches to the comity 
analysis pre-FTAIA would seem to have tremendous practical 
importance.81 On one hand, both the prudential standing question 
and the subject matter jurisdiction question should be addressed 
                                                          
 75. In Uranium Antitrust, the plaintiff, a U.S. corporation, brought a suit against 
foreign and domestic uranium producers alleging conduct occurring overseas had an effect 
on U.S. commerce. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 125354 (7th Cir. 
1980). 
 76. Id. at 125456. The factors considered by the district court were narrow and 
seemingly disconnected from the comity consideration. Id. (considering the complexity of 
the . . . action; the seriousness of the charges . . . ; and the recalcitrant attitude of the 
[defendants]). 
 77. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993). 
 78. See Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884 & n.7 (5th Cir. 
1982) (explaining that jurisdiction is not available if it would violate principles of comity 
and recognizing confusion over use of the word jurisdiction); see also Am. Rice, Inc. v. 
Ark. Rice Growers Coop. Assn, 701 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 1983) (considering factors 
relevant to comity in the context of extraterritorial application of the trademark laws). 
 79. Indus. Inv. Dev., 671 F.2d at 884 & n.7 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 
(1946)). 
 80. Id. at 884 n.7; see also Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869
70 (10th Cir. 1981) (stating that the comity question is a subject matter jurisdiction 
analysis); Uranium Antitrust, 617 F.2d at 1255. 
 81. See Aidan Robertson & Marie Demetriou, But That Was in Another 
Country . . .: The Extra-Territorial Application of the US Antitrust Laws in the US 
Supreme Court, 43 INTL & COMP. L.Q. 417, 42021 (1994) (observing that this distinction 
could greatly expand extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act and noting that no court 
has refused jurisdiction solely on comity grounds). 
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at the beginning of the litigation, before a court proceeds to the 
merits of the case.82 But unlike the subject matter jurisdiction 
question, the prudential standing question is waivable.83 That 
distinction is important. Under a prudential standing test, 
litigation can proceed when the investment by the plaintiff and 
the judicial system exceeds the harm associated with proceeding 
in what, ab initio, might be found an inappropriate forum.84 If, as 
all the multifactor comity tests recognize, the importance to the 
United States of regulating the particular conduct is a relevant 
question, no reason exists why that factor could not acquire 
controlling weight once the investment in litigation has achieved 
sufficient magnitude. 
The Ninth and Third circuits different procedural 
approaches also explain subtle differences in their substantive 
rules. The factors considered under the Timberlane jurisdictional 
approach are fewer than in the Mannington Mills standing 
approach.85 The Timberlane factors concentrate on concerns such 
as the relative robustness of compensation and deterrence in the 
competing jurisdictions.86 The additional Mannington Mills 
factors speak, instead, more directly to the long term effect of 
extraterritorial enforcement on commerce.87 
                                                          
 82. See Verizon Commcns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 416 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting that in any complex case, the court 
should first look to see whether plaintiff has standing); Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 
101 F.3d 1315, 132021 (9th Cir. 1996) (Trott, J., concurring) (standing is a threshold 
issue); Indus. Inv. Dev., 671 F.2d at 886 (standing must be determined from the 
pleadings). 
 83. See, e.g., Uranium Antitrust, 617 F.2d at 1255 (affirming the district courts 
discretion in determining prudential standing). 
 84. See Huffman, supra note 2 (manuscript at 51). The Ninth and Third circuits 
different procedural approaches also explain subtle differences in their substantive rules. 
The factors considered under the Timberlane jurisdictional approach are fewer than in 
the Mannington Mills standing approach. The Timberlane factors concentrate on concerns 
including the relative robustness of compensation and deterrence in the competing 
jurisdictions. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 
1976), superseded by statute, FTAIA of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, 96 Stat. 1246. 
The additional Mannington Mills factors speak, instead, more directly to the concerns for 
stepping on toes of trading partners through extraterritorial enforcement. See 
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 129192 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 85. Compare Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614 (laying out seven factors that should be 
weighed while deciding whether extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States should 
be asserted), with Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 129798 (agreeing with Timberlane, but 
listing instead ten different factors to be considered in making the same determination). 
 86. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614 (listing, for example, the extent to which 
enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance). 
 87. See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 129798 (supplementing the Timberlane list 
with factors such as the [p]ossible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises 
jurisdiction and grants relief). 
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As an empirical matter, though, it is difficult to find in the 
cases any practical effect owed to the differences between the 
substantive and procedural rules governing the pre-FTAIA 
effects test.88 For example, the Seventh Circuit in Uranium 
Antitrust read the Timberlane rule as requiring a discretionary 
comity consideration following the jurisdictional inquiry.89 Even 
in Judge Beckers careful analysis for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co. of the history of the effects test and the differences 
between Mannington Mills and Timberlane, the courtalthough 
bound by Mannington Mills treatment of comity considerations 
as a standing inquiryultimately determined that its 
responsibility was to determine the extent of its subject matter 
jurisdiction over claims against foreign defendants.90 
Both the D.C. Circuit in Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena91 and 
the Second Circuit in National Bank of Canada v. Interbank 
Card Association92 declined to apply the comity-driven approach 
followed by the Ninth and Third Circuits, and approved by the 
Fifth and Seventh Circuits.93 According to the D.C. Circuit, the 
                                                          
 88. According to the D.C. Circuit in Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, [a] pragmatic 
assessment of those decisions adopting an interest balancing approach indicates none 
where United States jurisdiction was declined when there was more than a de minimis 
United States interest. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 95051 & n.156 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that in National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Assn, 666 
F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1981), Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 870 (10th Cir. 
1981), Vespa of America Corp. v. Bajaj Auto Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 224, 229 (N.D. Cal. 1982), 
and Conservation Council of W. Australia., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 518 F. Supp. 
270, 276 (W.D. Pa. 1981), the courts uniformly held the effects were not sufficient to come 
within the purview of the antitrust laws rather than declining to exercise jurisdiction as a 
matter of balancing the comity factors). 
  The differences would be procedural in nature. The subject matter jurisdiction 
question is not waivable, while the standing question can be waived. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. 
of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). The Fifth Circuit in 
Industrial Investment Development identified another practical implication of the 
procedural question: placing discretionary determinations within the jurisdictional 
analysis would remove that discretionary decision from review on appealan 
unacceptable outcome in the Fifth Circuits view. Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 
671 F.2d 876, 884 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 89. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980). Contra 
Conservation Council of W. Austl., 518 F. Supp. at 275 (interpreting Timberlane to require 
the comity analysis as part of the jurisdictional analysis). 
 90. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 118789 
(E.D. Pa. 1980). 
 91. Laker Airways, Ltd., 731 F.2d 909. Laker Airways involved a defensive 
preliminary injunction, in which the plaintiff sought to enjoin defendants overseas 
action, which in turn was intended to preclude the plaintiffs suit in a U.S. antitrust court. 
Id. at 916, 92021. 
 92. Natl Bank of Can., 666 F.2d 6. 
 93. See Laker Airways, Ltd., 731 F.2d at 934 (Although one state may exercise its 
prescriptive jurisdiction to create an exclusive remedy for an injury, absent some other 
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Timberlane factors were inapplicable to a circumstance in which 
two sovereigns each legitimately could exercise jurisdiction over 
the conduct.94 In National Bank of Canada, the Second Circuit 
did not need to apply the Timberlane factors to conclude, based 
on the antitrust injury rule from Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo 
Bowl-o-Mat, Inc.,95 that the actionable aspect of the restraint, 
the anticompetitive effect, is felt only within the foreign market 
in which the injured plaintiff seeks to compete.96 
B. Congresss Response: The FTAIA 
Congresss purposes in enacting the FTAIA were three-fold. 
First, the FTAIA is protectionist legislation.97 Congress sought to 
                                                          
overriding constitutional stricture, that exclusivity is never so total as to prevent another 
sovereign from disregarding a foreign remedy in favor of its own administrative scheme 
tailored to serve its unique needs.); see also Indus. Inv. Dev., 671 F.2d at 884 & n.7 
(borrowing the reasoning from Mannington Mills and Timberlane); Uranium Antitrust, 
617 F.2d at 125455 (providing the Seventh Circuits perspective); Mannington Mills, Inc. 
v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1290 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank 
of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 61215 (9th Cir. 1976), superseded by statute, FTAIA of 1982, Pub. 
L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, 96 Stat. 1246. 
 94. Laker Airways, Ltd., 731 F.2d at 94849 & nn.14546 (rejecting application of 
factors from the Third Restatement, Timberlane, and Mannington Mills); id. at 950 & 
nn.15354 (arguing that the Timberlane and Mannington Mills comity balancing 
approach has not gained more than a temporary foothold in domestic law and has been 
rejected by courts, including the Second Circuit, as well as scholars); see also Note, 
Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 1310, 132325 (1985) (criticizing balancing tests such as those from 
Timberlane and Mannington Mills as inherently unfaithful to the principle of comity). But 
see Laker Airways, Ltd., 731 F.2d at 956 (Starr, J., dissenting) (stating that even though 
the application of the principles of comity may be difficult, United States courts are 
required to recognize the interests of another sovereign in appropriate circumstances); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(3) (1987) (establishing that 
where two sovereigns may exercise legitimate jurisdiction in a case, the state with the 
lesser interest should defer). 
  The Laker Airways court took issue with the very term extraterritoriality, 
arguing that where the standards for the assertion of adjudicative authority were met, 
the application of the U.S. antitrust laws was not extraterritorial at all. See Laker 
Airways, Ltd., 731 F.2d at 923; see also W.L. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE 
ANTITRUST LAWS 20 (1958); ZWARENSTEYN, supra note 19, at 139 (concluding the wrong 
occurs where the injury occursa conclusion that, if robust, reconciles the American 
Banana conduct approach with the modern effects approach). Of course, that view 
presumes the conclusion that the court is not overreaching. See ZWARENSTEYN, supra note 
19, at 12930 (describing Fugates statement as euphamistic).  
 95. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). 
 96. Natl Bank of Can., 666 F.2d at 8. 
 97. On the protectionist potential for competition policy generally, see Paul B. 
Stephan, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of International Cooperation, 38 
CORNELL INTL L.J. 173, 182 (2005) (Modern trade theory offers strong support for 
specific uses of competition rules to protect domestic producers.). But see Wood, supra 
note 10, at xiv (Sometimes observers wonder if nationalistic considerations influence 
enforcement decisions. My personal view is that the answer is no. . . . [T]he laws are not 
written that way and in general are not enforced that way.). 
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alleviate the concern that American antitrust laws are a barrier 
to joint export activities that promote efficiencies in the export of 
American goods and services.98 When the FTAIA was enacted in 
1982, U.S. antitrust laws were substantially more robust than 
most foreign antitrust regimes.99 Also, the effects of plaintiff-
friendly Warren Court precedents remained significant.100 
Second, the FTAIA was designed to alleviate tension between the 
United States and its trading partners arising from 
extraterritorial application of U.S. competition policy in conflict 
with foreign competition law.101 Third, Congress recognized the 
confusion resulting from differences among lower courts in their 
expression[s] of the proper test for determining whether U.S. 
antitrust jurisdiction over international transactions exists.102 
                                                          
 98. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2487; 
see also Wood, supra note 10, at xiv (acknowledging that export control exceptions can be 
explained only by a lack of concern for the welfare of foreign consumers). 
 99. See William E. Kovacic, Extraterritoriality, Institutions, and Convergence in 
International Competition Policy, 97 AM. SOCY INTL L. PROC. 309, 309 (2003) (describing 
the U.S. competition regime as the only effective regime several decades ago, and noting 
that despite the rampant growth of the number of antitrust regimes, many antitrust 
laws still lack effective implementation); Jonathan T. Schmidt, Keeping U.S. Courts Open 
to Foreign Antitrust Plaintiffs: A Hybrid Approach to the Effective Deterrence of 
International Cartels, 31 YALE J. INTL L. 211, 223 (noting that, in part, the FTAIA 
intended to allow U.S. firms to profit from other countries less stringent competition 
laws). But compare William E. Kovacic, Private Monitoring and Antitrust Enforcement: 
Paying Informants to Reveal Cartels, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 766, 78990 (2001) (detailing 
developments in U.S. antitrust laws), with Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: 
Hearings on H.R. 2326 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 79 (1981) [hereinafter FTAIA Hearings] (statement of 
John Shenefield, Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy) (The German merger law 
in some ways is far more aggressive than ours. The European Community antitrust acts 
reach out in a way we would be unlikely to.). 
  Joelson notes that economic philosophy consistent with modern antitrust 
sentiment existed as early as Aristotle, and Roman antitrust legislation was in effect in 
50 B.C. JOELSON, supra note 10, at 1. Common law principles were developed in England 
in the 13th Century. Id. Canadas initial national antitrust legislation was passed in 
1889, a year before the Sherman Act in 1890. See Michael Bliss, Another Anti-trust 
Tradition: Canadian Anti-Combines Policy, 18891910, 47 BUS. HIST. REV. 177, 177 
(1973). During the twentieth century, however, development of robust antitrust policy 
was occurring in the United States at times when foreign governments encouraged the 
development of strong business forces even if that entailed the creation of cartels or 
monopolies. JOELSON, supra note 10, at 34. 
 100. See BORK, supra note 6, at 17 (observing that the advancement of small 
business welfare was a dominant antitrust goal during the era of the Warren Court); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 46 (2d ed. 2001) (1976) (identifying 1962 as the peak 
of private antitrust suits leading to large awards in private damages). 
 101. See, e.g., FTAIA Hearings, supra note 99, at 2 (statement of Rep. Peter W. 
Rodino, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (Some foreign animosity toward U.S. 
antitrust enforcement might also be eliminated, because the domestic-effects standard 
being proposed would limit the reach of our antitrust laws in a manner consistent with 
our major trading partners.). 
 102. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2; see also O.N.E. Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante 
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1. Protectionist Intent and Effect. Although fear of antitrust 
liability naturally flows from uncertainty over the scope of 
enforcement, Congresss response to the perceptions of the 
business community in 1982 is properly separated from that 
constituencys confusion over the standards followed in applying 
the effects test.103 Congress recognized that the perception of the 
antitrust laws hindering export activity was false or overstated.104 
Some testimony in the hearing record suggests that the United 
States is doing well as an exporter and that whatever problems 
that might exist are not caused by our antitrust laws.105 [T]he 
three government policies that most discourage U.S. exports are 
taxation of Americans employed abroad, uncertainties about 
enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and export 
control regulations.106 
Instead, Congresss approach was protectionist. The effect 
was to prefer U.S. businesses and consumers to foreign 
businesses and consumers because the FTAIA permits only U.S. 
exporters to sue to remedy harm to competition that occurred in 
U.S. export commercegiving license for U.S. exporters to 
engage in conduct causing harm felt only in foreign commerce.107 
                                                          
Grancolombiana, 830 F.2d 449, 451 (2d Cir. 1987) (In an effort to provide a single 
standard to determine whether American antitrust laws apply to a given extraterritorial 
transaction, Congress enacted the [FTAIA].); Edward D. Cavanagh, The FTAIA and 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Foreign Transactions Under the Antitrust Laws: The New 
Frontier in Antitrust Litigation, 56 SMU L. REV. 2151, 2158 (2003) (noting two purposes 
of limit[ing] the antitrust exposure of American exporters and clarify[ing] the 
jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act); Kevin OMalley, Note, Does U.S. Antitrust 
Jurisdiction Extend to Claims of Independent/Dependent Foreign Injury?, 20 TEMP. INTL 
& COMP. L.J. 219, 222 (2006) (articulating the same two rationales). 
 103. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (identifying the two as separate problems that 
the Act intends to address). 
 104. See id. (describing as at best speculative claims that antitrust laws have any 
negative impact on exports and asserting that the Act cannot be a cure-all for every 
problem afflicting exports). 
 105. Id. at 4. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000) (allowing U.S. exporters to bring a monopolization 
claim); H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 4 (stating that a remedy for harm in export commerce is 
only available for impact on commerce within the United States or a domestic firm 
competing for foreign trade). This protectionist effect is especially marked because of the 
FTAIAs requirement that there be a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable 
effect on U.S. commerce, which will operate to preclude suits alleging a spillover effect in 
U.S. commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2000); H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 89. But see H.R. REP. 
NO. 97-686, at 13 (predicting that the spillover effect in U.S. commerce from export 
cartels is likely to be direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable). [E]xport cartels 
are a well-known exception to the ukase against cartels. Keith R. Fisher, Transparency 
in Global Merger Review: A Limited Role for the WTO?, 11 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 326, 377 
n.211 (2006) (citing Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust 
Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343, 397 (1997)); see also Diane P. Wood, The U.S. Antitrust 
Laws in a Global Context, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 265, 267 (noting the problem of 
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The FTAIA therefore provides a potential safe harbor for 
virtually any export transaction which does not affect the U.S. 
domestic market or the business opportunities of other U.S. 
exporters.108 
The protectionist effect almost surely was purposeful. The 
legislative history concentrates wholly on export commerce and 
the finding of ways to ease antitrust burdens on U.S. exporters.109 
The Declaration of Purpose statement of the Export Trading 
Company Act of 1982,110 of which the FTAIA is Title IV, related 
the importance of exports to the following: job creation and U.S. 
economic growth;111 the concerns for trade deficits;112 the failure of 
small business to engage in sufficient export business;113 the 
ineffectiveness of agricultural export efforts;114 the failure of U.S. 
exporters to achieve sufficient economies of scale;115 and the 
concern that government regulation was the reason for 
insufficient export activity by U.S. business.116 The purpose of the 
Export Trading Company Act was to make a four-pronged attack 
on the perceived problems with U.S. export trade.117 One prong 
was the modif[ication of] the application of the antitrust laws to 
certain export trade.118 The purpose of the law was to exempt 
                                                          
legally tolerated export cartels). 
 108. 1 WALLER, supra note 3, § 9:7, at 9-12. 
 109. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (H.R. 5235 is one of several bills . . . that 
seek[s] to promote American exports.); id. at 4 ([I]t is an article of orthodoxy in the 
business community that the antitrust laws stand as an impediment to the international 
competitive performance of the United States. (quoting the statement of former 
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust John Shenefield)); id. at 56 (noting a second, 
related problem [of] possible ambiguity in the precise legal standard to be employed in 
determining whether American antitrust law is to be applied, which causes undue 
caution by exporters). 
 110. Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. I, § 101, 96 Stat. 
1233, 1233 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 40014003 (2000)). 
 111. 15 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), (2) (2000). 
 112. 15 U.S.C. § 102(a)(3) (2000). 
 113. 15 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4) (2000). 
 114. 15 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2000). 
 115. 15 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (2000). 
 116. 15 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (2000). 
 117. 15 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
 118. Id. If the goal of the legislation had been primarily to settle [b]usiness 
perception that antitrust laws prohibit legitimate joint activity, H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 
4 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2489, the FTAIA and its analog in the 
Federal Trade Commission Act would have been almost wholly superfluous to 
amendments to section 7 of the Clayton Act. Also part of the Export Trading Company Act 
of 1982 amendments to section 7 were drafted broadly, with the purpose of exempting 
joint venture activityincluding incidental activityfrom the restrictions of section 7. 
Id. at 12; see also 1 WALLER, supra note 3, § 9:7, at 9-9 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 40114021 
(2000)). However, as Professor Waller has also noted, the FTAIA is more relied on than 
the formal immunity provisions available for export conduct. 1 WALLER, supra note 3, 
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collective export activities from the provisions of the Sherman 
Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. 119 
Any Congressional concern for foreign injury arises almost 
wholly in the context of concern for insufficient deterrence of 
conduct with a domestic effect.120 Citing the rationale underlying 
the Supreme Courts 1978 Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India 
opinion,121 the House Report stated that to deny foreigners a 
recovery could under some circumstances so limit the deterrent 
effect of U.S. antitrust law that defendants would continue to 
violate our laws.122 In contrast to a common law 
extraterritoriality analysis, no concerns are expressed for 
potential harm to foreign consumers or the exporting of bad 
conduct occurring within the United States.123 
2. Mitigating International Tension. Judge Starr wrote in 
1984, [a] tempest has been brewing for some time among the 
nations as to the reach of this countrys antitrust laws.124 Early 
in the hearings that spread over both sessions of the 97th 
Congress, before the FTAIA was passed in October 1982, 
Congressman Rodino recognized the international tension caused 
by exporting U.S. competition policy.125 Congressman Rodino 
noted that many of our closest allies and trading partners resent 
the extraterritorial reach of our antitrust laws.126 The 
international tension was not merely theoretical. For example, 
the United Kingdom had enacted legislation precluding the 
                                                          
§ 9:7, at 9-13. 
 119. JOELSON, supra note 10, at 40. 
 120. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 10 (stating that conduct having the requisite 
domestic affects gives rise to a cause of action for both foreign and domestic purchasers); 
see also OMalley, supra note 102, at 224 ([Where] a large cartel might create a spillover 
effect in which inflated prices in foreign markets would have the effect of raising domestic 
prices[,] . . . such an impact would more than likely meet the direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic commerce.). 
 121. Pfizer, Inc. v. Govt of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978). 
 122. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 10. 
 123. Cf. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1975) (Congress 
did not mean the United States to be used as a base for fraudulent securities schemes 
even when the victims are foreigners, at least in the context of suits by the SEC or by 
named foreign plaintiffs.). 
 124. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Starr, J., 
dissenting). 
 125. FTAIA Hearings, supra note 99, at 1 (statement of Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr., 
Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (observing that some of our closest allies have 
even enacted laws to block our enforcement efforts); see also Wood, supra note 10, at xi 
(It would be difficult to overstate the sense of outrage [U.S. antitrust extraterritoriality] 
provoked in many countries . . . .). 
 126. FTAIA Hearings, supra note 99, at 1 (statement of Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr., 
Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
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enforcement of judgments obtained under U.S. antitrust laws.127 
Mitigating international tension became a theme occupying 
much attention through the development of what became the 
FTAIA. According to Professor Eleanor Fox of New York 
University, [w]e do not, and should not seek, thus to export 
American antitrust.128 
But empirical evidence gathered shortly before the FTAIAs 
enactment concluded that America was indeed exporting.129 In 
Timberlane, Judge Choy noted that [i]n actual litigation, 
jurisdiction has not often been found lacking. Up to May 1973, the 
Department of Justice filed some 248 foreign trade antitrust cases; 
not one was lost for want of jurisdiction over the activities claimed 
to violate the law.130 Private actions fared nearly as well: 
reported dismissals of [private] cases also appear to be 
infrequent. The only case lost on appeal on this ground was 
American Banana . . . .131 Despite this record of success in 
litigation, it was well understood that [e]xtraterritorial 
application [of the U.S. antitrust laws] is understandably a matter 
of concern for the other countries involved.132 For example, foreign 
governments were filing briefs as amici challenging the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws, and raising 
questions in particular about the Alcoa effects test.133 Alcoa and its 
progeny were attacked as being in violation of the principles of 
                                                          
 127. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 1 (Eng.); see also Laker 
Airways, Ltd., 731 F.2d at 946 (describing the British legislation as one indication of the 
British Governments objection to the scope of extraterritorial application of the U.S. 
antitrust laws). 
  Judge Starr, dissenting in Laker Airways, Inc., noted that the tension between 
the United Kingdom and the United States was of particular concern because we 
inherited so much of our legal system from the United Kingdom. Id. at 959 (Starr, J., 
dissenting). 
 128. FTAIA Hearings, supra note 99, at 27 (testimony of Professor Eleanor Fox, 
Professor of Law, New York University). 
 129. See Peter D. Trooboff, International Decisions, 83 AM. J. INTL L. 918, 929 (1989) 
(noting [t]he storm of controversy evoked by U.S. efforts during the 1970s to bring 
antitrust cases for transnational conduct). 
 130. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 608 n.12 (9th Cir. 1976), 
superseded by statute, FTAIA of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, 96 Stat. 1246 (citing 
FUGATE, supra note 94, app. B at 498). 
 131. Id. (citing James A. Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction of the American 
Antitrust Laws, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 521 (1974)). This was likely because the litigated 
cases have involved relatively obvious offenses and rather significant and apparent effects 
on competition within the United States. Id. at 611 (citing PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS 
KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 129 n.455 (3d ed. 1974); Rahl, supra, at 523). 
 132. Id. at 609. 
 133. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1254 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(noting that amici, in particular the United Kingdom contend that Alcoa is no longer to 
be accepted by United States Courts as settled law (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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international law.134 The FTAIA was Congresss attempt to 
address the concerns of foreign governments about perceived 
overreaching by U.S. antitrust courts.135 
3. Resolving Confusion over the Effects Test. Citing 
[u]ncertainty in the [v]erbal [f]ormulation of the [n]ature and 
[q]uantum of [e]ffects [t]hat [a]re [n]ecessary [t]o [c]reate 
[j]urisdiction [u]nder the [a]ntitrust [l]aws, Congress referenced 
what it viewed to be multifarious formulations of the Alcoa 
effects test that had cropped up among the circuits and in the 
Department of Justice Guidelines.136 Among Timberlane, 
Mannington Mills, National Bank of Canada, and trial court 
cases in the Southern District of New York and the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, six variations on the Alcoa rule had 
emerged.137 Other cases, not discussed in the legislative history, 
followed an effects test with slightly different phraseology.138 
                                                          
 134. ZWARENSTEYN, supra note 19, at 12122 (citing IVO E. SCHWARTZ, DEUTSCHES 
INTERNATIONALES KARTELLRECHT 245 (1962)); see also JOELSON, supra note 10, at 3839 
(noting that the Alcoa rule prompted much outcry from foreign nations at this 
extraterritorial imposition of U.S. antitrust law). 
  The corollary concern is for reactionary overreaching by foreign courts that has 
the effect of regulating U.S. commerce. Just as American law may be unpalatable to a 
foreign sovereign, the foreign sovereigns laws may be unpalatable to the American 
scheme. See, e.g., WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 
11516 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1993) (1914) (discussing the law in Australia, the home 
of radicalism and fads and nostrums on the subject of trade restraints). The concerns for 
conflict bear more weight if the various legal schemes conflict, than if they converge. See 
ZWARENSTEYN, supra note 19, at 99100. 
 135. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 946 & n.137 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(describing the FTAIA as a limited exception[ ] to Congresss failure to take action to 
address the international concerns). 
 136. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 5 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2490; 
see also JOELSON, supra note 10, at 40 ([S]ome commentators labeled the Timberlane 
doctrine and its ilk as being uncounselable law, i.e., they questioned whether a lawyer 
striving to counsel a business person on legal compliance under the jurisdictional rule of 
reason could fairly anticipate what conclusion a court would subsequently reach . . . .). 
 137. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 5 (citing Natl Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Assn, 
666 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1981); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 
(3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1976), 
superseded by statute, FTAIA of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, 96 Stat. 1246; 
Waldbaum v. Worldvision Enters., Inc., 84 F.R.D. 95, 9598 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Industria 
Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.P.A. v. Exxon Research & Engg Co., No. 75 Civ. 5828-CSH, 
1977 WL 1353, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1977); Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 586, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1974)). 
 138. See, e.g., Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 610 (assessing the district courts application 
of a direct and substantial effect test (internal quotation marks omitted)). According to 
Judge Choy in Timberlane, [t]he same [direct and substantial effects] formula was 
employed, to some extent, by the district courts in [United States v. Swiss Watchmakers of 
Switzerland Info. Ctr., Inc. (Swiss Watchmakers), 1963 Trade Cas. ¶ 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 20, 1962),] in United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D. Cal. 
1957), and in [United States v.] General Electric [Co.], 82 F. Supp. [753, 891 (D.N.J. Jan. 
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None of those courts had adopted the Department of Justices 
formulation in the Antitrust Guide to International Operations 
that the U.S. antitrust laws apply when there is a substantial 
and foreseeable effect on the U.S. commerce.139 Dean Rahl 
observe[d] [t]here is no agreed black-letter rule articulating the 
Sherman Acts commerce coverage in the international 
context.140 
It is doubtful the 97th Congress correctly perceived the state 
of confusion that had arisen in the regulated community 
regarding the reach of the effects test.141 Initially, the reliance in 
House Report 686 on decisions from the Southern District of New 
York and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as examples of the 
confused state of the law ignores that those cases came from 
circuitsthe Second and the Thirdthat had made authoritative 
pronouncements on the application and interpretation of the 
Alcoa rule.142 One such pronouncement, in the Third Circuits 
Mannington Mills decision, substantivelyalthough not as a 
matter of procedure143was very close to the Ninth Circuits 
                                                          
19, 1949)]. Id. 
  The Fifth Circuit had a different formulation[a] restraint that directly or 
substantially affects the flow of commerce into or out of the United States is within the 
scope of the Sherman Act. Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 883 (5th 
Cir. 1982) (emphasis added); see also Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., 
Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Indeed, it is probably not necessary for the 
effect on foreign commerce to be both substantial and direct, as long as it is not de 
minimis.). 
 139. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 5 (quoting U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE TO 
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 67 (1977)). According to one witness before the House 
Judiciary Committee, [t]he uncertainty that exists today . . . is the result of two 
standards, one for private actions and a different standard set forth as the current 
enforcement policy of the Justice Department in its Antitrust Guide for International 
Operations. FTAIA Hearings, supra note 99, at 38 (remarks of David N. Goldsweig, 
Attorney, General Motors Corp.). 
 140. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 611 (quoting Rahl, supra note 131, at 611). One 
commentator noted that before the FTAIA, the effects test had devolved into several 
forms, including an effects only test, a direct or substantial effects test, a direct and 
substantial effects test, and a some effects, regardless of whether they are intended or 
substantial, test. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 806 (footnotes omitted). 
 141. Cf. TAFT, supra note 134, at 96 (arguing that judicial interpretations of the 
Sherman Act are effective in providing notice of illegality to members of the regulated 
community). 
 142. See Natl Bank of Can., 666 F.2d at 8 (concluding that the inquiry should be 
whether the challenged restraint has, or is intended to have, any anticompetitive effect); 
Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1292 (commenting that a court has jurisdiction when harm 
to the export business of an American litigant occurs). 
 143. See supra notes 6671 and accompanying text (comparing Timberlane, in which 
the comity analysis was part of the subject matter jurisdiction inquiry, with Mannington 
Mills, in which the comity analysis was part of a prudential standing inquiry). 
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Timberlane formulation, which had received significant notice 
and discussion among the courts.144 
Also, Congress recognized that [t]he precise effect of these 
varying formulations [of the effects test] is disputed.145 A report 
of the ABA Antitrust Section, cited in the House of 
Representatives Report, concludedprobably correctlythat the 
differential wording of courts tests had little practical effect.146 
For example, concentrating on the degree of nexus between a 
domestic effect and foreign harmone of the areas of confusion 
under the modern extraterritoriality analysis147the Ninth 
Circuits Timberlane test required a demonstration of a link 
between the plaintiffs injury and an impact on U.S. commerce 
for jurisdiction.148 Likewise, in Industria Siciliana Asfalti, 
Bitumi, S.P.A. v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co., a case 
decided two years prior to Timberlane that was listed as one of 
the supposed conflict cases, the Southern District of New York 
relied on a connection between the foreign plaintiffs harm and 
an effect on U.S. commerce to uphold jurisdiction over the 
plaintiffs claim.149 Perhaps for those reasons, one witness at the 
hearings testified, It has never been shown that antitrust is a 
significant disincentive to exports . . . .150 
Emphasizing an area of ostensible but insubstantial 
confusion, Congress failed to account for the confusion that time 
has proved to be of more significant importance: courts differing 
views on the injection of comity principles into the 
extraterritoriality analysis. Those differing views were in their 
                                                          
 144. Compare Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613 (finding that a tripartite analysis 
requiring some effect on foreign commerce, a cognizable injury, and a determination of the 
international setting was necessary), with Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1292 (requiring 
a substantial effect on foreign commerce). 
 145. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 5 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2490; 
cf. Note, American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV. 553, 
563 (1976) (Although the courts have spoken in the terms of the Restatement and of 
congressional policy, findings that an American effect was direct, substantial, and 
foreseeable, or within the scope of congressional intent, have little independent analytic 
significance. Instead, cases appear to turn on a reconciliation of American and foreign 
interests in regulating their respective economies and business affairs . . . .). 
 146. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 56. 
 147. See infra Part III.B (illustrating the confusion surrounding the requisite nexus 
between foreign and domestic effects); Huffman, supra note 2 (manuscript at 4348). 
 148. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613. 
 149. Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.P.A. v. Exxon Research & Engg Co., No. 
75 Civ. 5828-CSH, 1977 WL 1353, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1977) (upholding jurisdiction 
where the plaintiff was injured and the export of design and engineering services was 
restrained). 
 150. FTAIA Hearings, supra note 99, at 27, 28 (testimony of Professor Eleanor Fox, 
Professor of Law, New York University). 
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incipiency in 1982: the Ninth Circuits Timberlane rule stated the 
dominant approach favoring judicial balancing of comity 
concerns.151 This rule had been followed, but changed in 
important respects, by the Third Circuit in Mannington Mills 
and had been rejected by the Second Circuit in National Bank of 
Canada and the D.C. Circuit in Laker Airways.152 Congresss 
failure to recognize the importance of that area of confusion 
explains the lack of attention paid in the FTAIA to the 
application of international comity principles. The issue was left 
unaddressed in the statute and has become the crux of recent 
FTAIA litigation.153 
4. The Result. The FTAIA codified a version of the Alcoa 
effects test. Rejecting American Bananas bright-line approach, 
courtsmost notably the Second Circuit in Alcoa154held that if 
the extraterritorial conduct has a sufficient effect on U.S. 
commerce, a U.S. court will assert jurisdiction over an antitrust 
claim arising from that conduct.155 With the FTAIA, Congress 
                                                          
 151. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 61315. 
 152. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 91516 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(Accession to a demand for comity predicated on the coercive effects of a foreign judgment 
usurping legitimately concurrent prescriptive jurisdiction is unlikely to foster the 
processes of accommodation and cooperation which form the basis for a genuine system of 
international comity.); Natl Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Assn, 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 
1981) (rejecting Timberlanes comity considerations, balancing and stating that 
jurisdiction is possible only with an appreciable anticompetitive effect on this countrys 
commerce); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 
1979) (stating that when the practices of an American citizen abroad have a substantial 
effect on American foreign commerce, the Sherman Act applies). But see O.N.E. Shipping 
Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 830 F.2d 449, 451 (2d Cir. 1987) (The comity 
balancing test [of Timberlane and Mannington Mills] has been explicitly used by this 
Court.) (citing Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v. Societe Anonyme de Gerance et 
DArmement, 451 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
 153. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000). 
 154. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), 
superseded by statute, FTAIA of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, 96 Stat. 1246. The 
effects test in antitrust can be traced to the Supreme Courts earlier decision in United 
States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927) (holding that the results of the 
conspirators deliberate acts placed them within the Courts jurisdiction). 
 155. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 44344. The FTAIA codified an arguably more restrictive 
effects test in which the elements exist in the conjunctive: the overseas conduct must have 
a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic U.S. commerce. 15 
U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2000) (emphasis added); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 
U.S. 764, 796 n.23 (1993) (considering the direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable 
effect language). Whether a reasonably foreseeable effect is the same as an intended 
effect is not clear. See McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 120 n.9 (1st Cir. 2005) (The 
FTAIAs reasonably foreseeable requirement appears to be related to this traditional 
intent requirement.). 
  The effects test has analogs in many substantive legal schemes. See, e.g., id. at 
12021 (applying the substantial effects test to determine extraterritorial Lanham Act 
jurisdiction); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 961 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying an effects 
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created a hybrid statute that preserved the effects test and, of 
the various formulations available, most closely mirrored the 
Department of Justice Guidelines formulation.156 Admirable 
intentions to provide clarity in this area of the law were 
overborne by the inescapable vagueness of concepts of import and 
export commerce, the failure to consider the procedural basis of 
the FTAIA argument, and the failure to provide for treatment of 
claims of injury in import commerce that are specifically excepted 
from the statute.157 
III. STATUTORY ANALYSIS 
Like other statutes that memorialize limitations on courts 
power,158 the FTAIA first takes away courts authority over all 
antitrust claims in wholly foreign or export commercethen 
gives some back. Where the FTAIA applies, U.S. antitrust courts 
do not have authority to hear claims.159 That authority may be 
found if (1) the FTAIA does not apply, as in the case of import 
trade or import commerce,160 or (2) the exception is met, restoring 
the removed authority.161 The exception, in turn, has two primary 
parts. Subsection 1 requires that for conduct to be within the 
reach of the antitrust laws, it must have a direct, substantial, 
and reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic commerce, import 
commerce, or the business of U.S. exporters.162 Subsection 2 
                                                          
test in the context of extraterritorial application of the U.S. securities laws); Bersch v. 
Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 & n.24 (2d Cir. 1975) (same); OSRecovery, Inc. v. 
One Groupe Intl, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 357, 367 & n.74 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (applying an 
effects test in the context of a private RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964, relying 
on Bersch and Empagran). 
 156. The early recommendation of former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, 
John Shenefield, was to bring the bill . . . into line with Alcoa and the Antitrust Guide for 
International Operations, published by the Justice Department. FTAIA Hearings, supra 
note 99, at 69 (statement of John Shenefield, Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & 
McCloy); see also supra note 6 (reporting the language of the FTAIA, as signed into law in 
1982). 
 157. See infra Part III (describing problems with the FTAIAs vagueness). 
 158. Ready examples include the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 26712680 
(2000), and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 16021611 (2000). See 
MacArthur Area Citizens Assn v. Republic of Peru, 809 F.2d 918, 92123 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(comparing the Federal Tort Claims Act with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). 
 159. See F. HoffmannLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 16263 (2004) 
(stating that where the anticompetitive effect is foreign, the FTAIA general rule applies, 
precluding the U.S. courts authority to hear the claim); see also 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000) 
(providing the exception to the FTAIA general rule). 
 160. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000) (Sections 1 to 7 . . . shall not apply to conduct involving 
trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign 
nations . . . . (emphasis added)). 
 161. Id. 
 162. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2000). 
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requires further that the conduct give[ ] rise to a claim under 
the substantive antitrust laws.163 
Three aspects of the FTAIA have caused interpretive 
problems. First is the choice of effects test: Congresss 
formulation most closely approximates that of the Department of 
Justice in the 1975 international enforcement guidelines.164 But 
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable is not self-
defining and has created interpretive difficulties.165 Second, and 
most significant, is the requirement that the statutory effect 
give[ ] rise to a claim under the antitrust laws166loose 
phraseology that has caused of a recent spate of litigation at all 
levels of the federal court system.167 Third is the attempt to define 
the classes of commerce to which the statute should apply.168 
Inherently vague concepts of import commerce and export 
commerce have undermined attempts to define the statutes 
scope.169 
A. Direct, Substantial and Reasonably Foreseeable 
The first of two directness inquiries in the FTAIA is the 
codification of the Alcoa effects test.170 A number of cases have 
been dismissed by the U.S. courts since the enactment of the 
FTAIA for failing to meet this standard . . . .171 Under the 
statute, only if conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect in domestic U.S. commerce will claims based 
                                                          
 163. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) (2000) (referring to sections 1 to 7 of this title, other than this 
section). 
 164. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000) (articulating the effects test); infra Part III (describing 
the FTAIAs foundations). 
 165. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2000). 
 166. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) (2000). 
 167. See, e.g., F. HoffmannLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 17374 (2004) 
(attempting to establish the meaning of gives rise to a claim). 
 168. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)(A), (B) (2000). 
 169. Id.; see, e.g., Turicentro S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 303 (3d Cir. 
2002) (struggling with the definition of import trade or commerce). 
 170. Courts note the FTAIA adopts the modern effects test and not the American 
Banana conduct test. Compare CSR Ltd. v. Cigna Corp., 405 F. Supp. 2d 526, 546 (D.N.J. 
2005) ([T]he Court must reject any implication that the FTAIAs direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect requirement is met because certain of Defendants actions 
were taken or overseen in the United States.), with United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 
274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927) (finding jurisdiction because the Government alleged a 
conspiracy entered into by parties within the United States and made effective by acts 
done therein). 
 171. See JOELSON, supra note 10, at 41; see also, e.g., CSR Ltd., 405 F. Supp. 2d at 
54950 (finding that an Australian company plaintiff could not claim its injury was a 
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce). 
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on that conduct be cognizable in a U.S. antitrust court.172 
Notably, the FTAIA enacted an objective version of the intent 
requirement from Alcoa.173 While in that case jurisdiction was 
available over conduct if the plaintiff intended it to impact U.S. 
commerce and it did impact U.S. commerce,174 under the FTAIA, 
so long as the effect was reasonably foreseeable, the conduct can 
be reviewed. This alteration to the common-law test was 
intended to preclude a defense of unawareness of the 
consequences of ones actions.175 
One thoughtful analysis of the meaning of the directness 
requirement comes from the Ninth Circuits opinion in United 
States v. LSL Biotechnologies.176 That case relied on the use of the 
word direct in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),177 
which the Supreme Court had defined to mean follows as an 
immediate consequence of the defendants . . . activity.178 In LSL 
Biotechnologies, the allegations in the complaint relied on 
intervening events before the anticompetitive activity produced 
an effect in domestic commerce.179 A direct effect might occur if 
the conduct prevented immediate competition in the U.S. market, 
but that was not the scenario in LSL Biotechnologies.180 
Exactly how to reconcile the language in subsection 1 with 
the recognition in the legislative history that spillover effects 
from harm in export commerce should be sufficient to give rise to 
a claim in a U.S. antitrust court presents a challenge.181 By its 
terms, a spillover effect from export commerce should not be 
considered a direct effect in domestic commerce, and certainly 
does not meet the standard for direct from Republic of 
                                                          
 172. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2000). 
 173. Compare id. (creating an objective reasonably foreseeable effect standard), 
with supra notes 5155 and accompanying text (referring to the judicially created Alcoa 
test as a wide-reaching intended effects test). 
 174. See supra notes 5155 and accompanying text (discussing the Alcoa case and 
the Alcoa test). 
 175. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 9 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2494 
(An intent test might encourage ignorance of the consequences of ones actions, which in 
this context, would be an undesirable result.). 
 176. United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 177. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000) (discussing the application of 
sovereign immunity when the conduct in question has a direct effect in the United 
States). 
 178. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992) (quoting Weltover, 
Inc. v. Republic of Arg., 941 F.2d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 1991)) (omission in original). 
 179. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d at 681 (An effect cannot be direct where it 
depends on such uncertain intervening developments.). 
 180. See id. (explaining the facts and the scenario in the case). 
 181. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2000), with H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 10 (1982), as 
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 249495. 
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Argentina v. Weltover of follow[ing] as an immediate 
consequence of the defendants . . . activity.182  Indeed, in the 
context of the second directness inquiry under the FTAIA
whether foreign harm is sufficiently related to a domestic effect
the two courts of appeals to decide the question have held direct 
means secondary effects are not cognizable.183 
But looking at it another way, spillover effects can be either 
direct or indirect. A direct spillover might be a local price-fixing 
scheme implemented to support a price-fixing scheme in the 
export market, by preventing arbitrage or cheating.184 Such a 
scheme, if a spillover at all, is a spillover in name only. An 
indirect spillover effect might be an export price-fixing scheme 
that causes local prices to rise, as affected foreign buyers increase 
demand in domestic commerce in efforts to end-run the export 
price fixing.185 The larger and more long-term an effect, the more 
likely it would be considered sufficiently direct to satisfy 
subsection 1.186 
Another question raised by subsection 1 comes from the 
placement of direct and substantial in the conjunctive. Two 
early post-FTAIA cases from the Southern District of New 
YorkPapst Motoren GMbH & Co. v. Kanematsu-Goshu (U.S.A.) 
Inc. and El Cid, Ltd. v. New Jersey Zinc Co.have held that both 
size and directness of an effect are not required.187 Sufficient 
                                                          
 182. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. at 618 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Empagran 
S.A. v. F. HoffmannLaRoche, Ltd. (Empagran II), 417 F.3d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(finding an effect in foreign commerce, derived from a direct effect in U.S. commerce, 
insufficiently proximate to permit jurisdiction). 
 183. See infra notes 24850 and accompanying text. 
 184. Cf. Empagran II, 417 F.3d at 1269. Such a scheme, implemented and having an 
effect in domestic commerce, would be outside of the FTAIA. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 6a (2000). The spillover effect language in the legislative history, then, would only 
have the effect of averting the concern that the FTAIA placed a limit on courts ability to 
hear claims that were otherwise within the heartland of their antitrust jurisdiction 
because the conduct was related to a course of extraterritorial conduct. 
 185. One commentator reads into the legislative history an intent that this sort of 
indirect spillover effect would be within U.S. antitrust courts reach. See OMalley, supra 
note 102, at 224 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 10 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2495). 
 186. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 13 (concluding that the spillover effect would, at 
least over time meet the test of a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on 
domestic commerce). 
 187. Papst Motoren GMbH & Co. v. Kanematsu-Goshu (U.S.A.) Inc., 629 F. Supp. 
864, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (observing that any demonstrable effect on commerce that is 
more than de minimus as sufficient to invoke the Sherman Act); El Cid, Ltd. v. N.J. Zinc 
Co., 551 F. Supp. 626, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ([I]t is probably not necessary for the effect on 
foreign commerce to be both substantial and direct so long as it is not de minimus. 
(quoting Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979))). 
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magnitude of effect can be a proxy for directness.188 Both cases 
relied on pre-FTAIA authority to reach the conclusion that 
direct and substantial could operate in the disjunctive, and 
language in the legislative history also supports the proposition 
that directness is part-and-parcel of magnitude. But both cases 
also stated the rule in dicta; in both circumstances, the effect was 
held to be at most de minimis and the claims were not heard.189 
B. Gives Rise to a Claim 
The requirement that a harm in domestic commerce give[ ] 
rise to a claim has been the basis for extensive litigation at all 
levels of the federal court system since at least the late 1990s, 
and has removed the primary interpretive issue under the 
FTAIA. One case, F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, 
worked its way to the Supreme Court and produced an opinion on 
remand in the D.C. Circuit.190 Empagran is the primary source of 
the modern rules governing extraterritoriality under the FTAIA. 
In Empagran, plaintiffs alleged price fixing in violation of section 
1 on a worldwide scale.191 The plaintiffs were distributors of the 
price-fixed products from around the globe.192 Faced with 
worldwide conspiracy claims like those in Empagran, defendants 
argue, on the one hand, the FTAIA limits courts authority, 
allowing only those claims based on harm felt in U.S. 
commerce.193 Defendants also have argued the foreign 
purchasers, whose injuries were felt in foreign commerce, lacked 
antitrust standing.194 According to the latter argument, the 
plaintiffs must have suffered injuries flowing from the effects felt 
                                                          
 188. Papst Motoren, 629 F. Supp. at 869 (citing Dominicus Americana Bohio, 473 F. 
Supp. at 687); El Cid, 551 F. Supp. at 629 (explaining that any demonstrable effect 
would suffice). 
 189. Papst Motoren, 629 F. Supp. at 869; El Cid, 551 F. Supp. at 629. 
 190. F. HoffmannLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004); Empagran v. F. 
HoffmanLaRoche, Ltd. (Empagran II), 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 191. Empagran v. F. HoffmanLaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(alleging a Sherman Act violation under 15 U.S.C. § 1), vacated, 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
 192. Id. at 342.  
 193. Empagran v. F. HoffmanLa Roche, Ltd., No. Civ. 001686TFH, 2001 WL 
761360, at *2 (D.D.C. June 7, 2001) (arguing that the injury must be sustained in U.S. 
commerce and be the direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable result of the 
defendants conduct), revd and vacated, 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 
155 (2004). The Empagran plaintiffs were originally a class of foreign and domestic 
purchasers of vitamins, but to separate those claims subject to the FTAIA from those that 
were not, the district court bifurcated the class. Empagran, 315 F.3d at 342. 
 194. Empagran, 2001 WL 761360, at *5; see also Empagran, 315 F.3d at 342. 
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in U.S. commerce, which is the only harm the U.S. antitrust laws 
were intended to prevent.195 
1. The Definite and an Indefinite Article. Plaintiffs arguing 
for reading the FTAIA to permit claims of foreign harm make two 
arguments. Under one argument, so long as there was an effect 
in U.S. commerce, the effect need have no connection to the harm 
suffered by the plaintiffs.196 Plaintiffs rely on a close reading of 
the phrase gives rise to a claim in subsection 2.197 According to 
this argument, the conduct alleged must only give rise to a claim, 
which was not necessarily their own. The contrary view is that 
the effect in U.S. commerce must give rise to the plaintiffs 
claim.198 
This argument had split the courts of appeals. In 2001, the 
Fifth Circuit, over a strong dissent by Judge Higginbotham, held 
in Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap v. HeereMac VOF (Statoil) that 
gives rise to a claim required that the domestic effect of the 
defendants conduct must have caused the injury the plaintiff is 
suing over.199 The plaintiffs in Statoil had suffered their injuries 
from the defendants alleged bid-rigging in the North Sea.200 
Although the same course of conduct was alleged to have caused 
injuries in U.S. commerce, the plaintiffs before the Fifth Circuit 
did not suffer harm in U.S. commerce.201 Over Judge 
Higginbothams argument in dissent that the plain language of 
                                                          
 195. See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 810, Empagran, 315 F.3d 338 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (No. 01-7115) [hereinafter Brief for the United States & FTC], available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2003/3mer/1ami/2003-0724.mer.ami.pdf (arguing that 
the FTAIAs focus is on domestic effects of anticompetitive conduct and should not apply 
to injuries arising entirely in a foreign nation from an effect on foreign commerce). 
 196. Empagran, 315 F.3d at 344 (inquiring whether it [is] enough for a plaintiff to 
show that the anticompetitive effects of the defendants conduct on U.S. commerce give 
rise to an antitrust claim under the Sherman Act by someone, even if not the plaintiff who 
is before the court). 
 197. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) (2000). This sort of textual analysis has only recently gained 
traction in antitrust decisionmaking. See, e.g., Empagran, 542 U.S. at 17374; Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 1014, Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 
U.S. 164 (2006) (No. 04-905) (demanding a textual reason for an argument, not a policy 
reason). 
 198. A third view is that the conduct need not give rise to any private claims, so long 
as it creates jurisdiction and permits the government to sue to enforce the antitrust laws. 
See Kruman v. Christies Intl PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 399400 (2d Cir. 2002), abrogated by 
Empagran, 542 U.S. 155. 
 199. Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap v. HeereMac VOF (Statoil), 241 F.3d 420, 42122 
(5th Cir. 2001) (deciding that the plaintiff lacked standing because the injury did not 
arise from that domestic anticompetitive effect). 
 200. Id. at 421. 
 201. Id. at 42223 (noting criminal prosecution for bid rigging in U.S. commerce). 
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gives rise to a claim meant any claimincluding the claims of 
hypothetical plaintiffs not before the court202the panel majority 
held the plaintiffs suing must have suffered their injuries in 
domestic commerce to come within the reach of the FTAIA.203 
By contrast, in 2003, the D.C. Circuit in Empagran 
interpreted gives rise to a claim to mean a claim by any private 
plaintiff, whether or not that plaintiff was in front of the court. 
So long as some plaintiff suffered harm in domestic U.S. 
commerce from the effect of the complained-of conduct, the 
plaintiffs who suffered harm overseas, from the same conduct, 
were cognizable.204 Under the D.C. Circuits approach, foreign 
plaintiffs rights to sue would be derivative of the rights of 
hypothetical domestic plaintiffs. This opinion, too, was rendered 
over a dissent. Judge Henderson believed no basis existed in the 
FTAIA to establish a derivative right of action.205 
The Second Circuit, in 2002, followed the most liberal 
possible interpretation of the gives rise to a claim language. 
Under the approach in Kruman v. Christies Intl PLC,206 the 
complained-of conduct need not have caused any harm in U.S. 
commerce, so long as it provided a basis for a suit or prosecution 
by a government entity.207 Thus, a claim might include a claim 
brought by the United States, which unlike private plaintiffs, is 
not obliged to demonstrate harm.208 
Recognizing the conflict, the Seventh Circuit in 
Metallgesellschaft A.G. v. Sumitomo Corp. decided it need not 
come to a definitive resolution of the issue in this case.209 It 
preferred the approach followed in Kruman and Empagran, 
which it thought most consistent with its prior en banc holding in 
United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co.210 In 
                                                          
 202. Id. at 432 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (arguing that the use of a claim 
instead of the claim was intentional on the part of the drafters of the statute). 
 203. Id. at 42829 & n.28 (majority opinion). 
 204. See Empagran v. F. HoffmanLaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2003), 
vacated, 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
 205. Id. at 360 (Henderson, J., dissenting) ([G]ives rise to a claim refers to the 
claim advanced by the plaintiff in the action before the court.). 
 206. Kruman v. Christies Intl PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 399400 (2d Cir. 2002), abrogated 
by F. HoffmannLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
 207. Id. ([T]he FTAIA only requires that the domestic effect violate the substantive 
provisions of the Sherman Act.); see also Empagran, 315 F.3d at 34748 (discussing the 
Second Circuits holding in Kruman). 
 208. See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) (right of action provision for the United States); 
Empagran, 542 U.S. at 17071 (noting the distinction between private plaintiffs and 
government plaintiffs is that government plaintiffs need not show standing). 
 209. Metallgesellschaft A.G. v. Sumitomo Corp., 325 F.3d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 210. See id. at 83841; see also United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 
F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
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Metallgesellschaft, the plaintiff had alleged injuries suffered in 
U.S. domestic commerce as a result of physical copper 
transactions that took place within the United States or copper 
futures transactions on a U.S. exchange.211 
On the third effort to achieve Supreme Court review of this 
issue,212 the Supreme Court held in Empagran that plaintiffs 
must do more than merely allege the defendants antitrust-
violative conduct gave rise to a claim under the antitrust laws. 
The conduct must have given rise to the claim that formed the 
basis of their lawsuit.213 The most immediate result of the 
Empagran rule was that the Supreme Court vacated the decision 
of one Second Circuit case, Sniado v. Bank Austria, A.G.214 In 
Sniado, the Second Circuit followed the Kruman rule to hold that 
the existence of any claim in U.S. commerce was sufficient to 
permit a claim of injury felt in foreign commerce to proceed.215 On 
remand, the Second Circuit held the foreign plaintiffs claim 
could not be heard, because the plaintiffs had not alleged any 
nexus between a domestic effect of overseas conduct and their 
foreign injuries.216 
In Empagran, the Court rejected the textualist reading of 
the FTAIA followed by the majority of the D.C. Circuit panel.217 
This rejection is somewhat surprising. The literalist 
interpretation hews closely to the plain language of the FTAIA. 
                                                          
 211. See Metallgesellschaft A.G., 325 F.3d at 841. The involvement of a U.S. exchange 
distinguishes Metallgesellschaft from the Southern District of New Yorks holding in de 
Atucha v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., refusing to find standing for a plaintiff claiming harm 
from purchases on the London Mercantile Exchange. de Atucha v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 
608 F. Supp. 510, 51516 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Metallgesellschaft A.G., 325 F.3d at 841 
(distinguishing de Atucha). 
 212. The first certiorari petition was filed and denied in Statoil ASA v. HeereMac v.o.f., 
534 U.S. 1127 (2002). The Court called for the views of the Solicitor General, who 
recommended the petition not be granted because the Solicitor General believed the Fifth 
Circuits decision to be correct. See Brief for the United States and Federal Trade Commission 
as Amici Curiae at 5, Statoil ASA v. HeereMac v.o.f., No. 00-1842 (U.S. Jan. 3, 2002), available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2001/2pet/6invit/2000-1842.pet.ami.inv.pdf. The second 
petition was filed in Christies Intl PLC v. Kruman, 539 U.S. 978 (2003), but certiorari 
was dismissed when the parties settled. The Supreme Court finally granted certiorari on 
this issue in Empagran, 542 U.S. at 155. 
 213. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 17475. 
 214. Compare id. at 17374 (declaring that the domestic effect of the alleged 
antitrust conduct must give rise to the plaintiffs claim), with Sniado v. Bank Austria AG, 
352 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2003) (requiring only that the effect of conduct on domestic 
commerce give rise to a claim under the Sherman Act, not specifically to plaintiffs 
claim), vacated, 378 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 215. Sniado, 352 F.3d at 78. 
 216. Sniado, 378 F.3d at 21213 (vacating the earlier panels decision and affirming 
the district courts dismissal of the case, in light of Empagran). The Second Circuit held 
that in light of Empagran, the complaint must be dismissed. Id. at 212. 
 217. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 17375. 
(3)HUFFMAN.DOC 4/26/2007 12:47 PM 
322 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [44:2 
Section 6a(1) permits suit in a U.S. antitrust court if the 
complained-of conduct gives rise to a claim under the 
substantive antitrust laws.218 The Court noted respondents 
linguistic logic regarding Congresss choice of the indefinite 
article a.219 It acknowledged respondents linguistic arguments 
might show that respondents reading is the more natural 
reading of the statutory language.220 In concurrence, Justice 
Scaliafamous for his textualist statutory interpretive 
philosophy221concur[red] in the judgment of the Court because 
the language of the statute is readily susceptible of the 
interpretation the Court provides.222 
Two primary rationales support the Supreme Courts 
interpretation of the troublesome subsection 2. First, the 
prescriptive comity doctrine supports a construction that 
avoid[s] unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority 
of other nations.223 Under this doctrine, [A]n act of congress 
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any 
other possible construction remains.224 Though it clearly has 
constitutional authority to do so, Congress is generally presumed 
                                                          
 218. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) (2000); see supra Part II.B (describing the FTAIA). 
 219. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 174. 
 220. Id. The majority was comfortable that notions of prescriptive comity overcame 
the statutes plain language. Id. at 175.  
 221. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 2325 (1997) (praising textualism as an analytical tool); see also Max Huffman, 
Using All Available Information, 25 REV. LITIG. 501, 51718 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN 
G. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005) 
(describing Justice Scalias use of textualism)). 
 222. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 176 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia was swayed 
by principles of deference to the application of foreign countries laws within their own 
territories. Id. 
 223. Id. at 164 (majority opinion) (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de 
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 2022 (1963)). On prescriptive comity generally, see 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 81222 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting in 
part). Under this doctrine, [a]n act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the 
law of nations if any other possible construction remains. Id. at 81415 (quoting Murray 
v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.)). Though 
it clearly has constitutional authority to do so, Congress is generally presumed not to 
have exceeded those customary international-law limits on jurisdiction to prescribe. Id. 
at 815. See generally Pamela Karten Bookman, Note, Solving the Extraterritoriality 
Problem: Lessons from the Honest Services Statute, 92 VA. L. REV. 749, 75559 (2006) 
(describing the prescriptive comity doctrine). 
  The Empagran Court expressed grave concern for the international comity 
ramifications of U.S. antitrust courts jurisdictional overreaching. As in cases in lower 
courts leading up to the enactment of the FTAIA, the presence in the litigation of several 
foreign government amici figured prominently in the opinion. Compare Empagran, 542 
U.S. at 16769 (citing to briefs filed by the governments of Germany, Canada, and Japan), 
with In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 125455 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting the 
involvement of the government of the United Kingdom in the litigation). 
 224. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 81415 (quoting Murray, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118). 
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not to have exceeded those customary international-law limits on 
jurisdiction to prescribe.225 Second, the passage of the statute 
narrowed, rather than broadened, the scope of extraterritorial 
application of the U.S. antitrust laws, and no cases prior to 1982 
permitted suit by private plaintiffs injured in foreign 
commerce.226 
The emphasis on comity in the Supreme Court is a sea-
change. Eleven years prior in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. 
California, the Court had defined the scope of the comity analysis 
narrowly.227 In Hartford Fire, the Court considered allegations 
that insurers had conspired overseas to limit the sort of 
insurance policies that would be written and that the conspiracy 
affected U.S. consumers.228 Although the conspiracy occurred 
overseas, because its effects were felt in the United States, U.S. 
courts had jurisdiction over claims against those insurers.229 The 
limited comity consideration the Court endorsed in Hartford Fire 
asked whether there was a direct conflict between the U.S. 
scheme and the particular foreign regulatory scheme at issue.230 
Because British law did not require the conduct in which the 
defendants had engaged, the Court held there was no direct 
conflict.231 Justice Scalias dissent in Hartford Fire would have 
                                                          
 225. Id. at 815. 
 226. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 169, 17173. The opinion qualified this discussion as 
helpful [f]or those who find legislative history useful. Id. at 163. Writing for six Justices, 
Justice Breyer appears to be referring in this passage to a concurrence in which Justice 
Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment by relying solely on the text 
of the statute and canons of construction. See id. at 176 (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). See generally Huffman, supra note 221, at 50506 & n.19 (noting the 
regularity with which Justices Breyer and Scalia concur in each others opinions, 
advancing their own views of the statutory interpretive process). 
  Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in the judgment only. Empagran, 542 
U.S. at 176 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). They would have relied solely on the 
text of the FTAIA, interpreted in light of the principle that statutes should be read in 
accord with the customary deference to the application of foreign countries laws within 
their own territoriesthat is, the prescriptive comity canon. Id. at 176. 
 227. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798; see also Hannah L. Buxbaum, National Courts, 
Global Cartels: F. HoffmannLaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A. (U.S. Supreme Court 2004), 
5 GERMAN L.J. 1095, 1101 (2004) (discussing Empagran as evidence of a renewed 
interest on the part of the Supreme Court in using principles of comity to confine the 
extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law). 
 228. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 76972. 
 229. Id. at 795 (noting that the London reinsurers conceded to the federal courts 
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act). 
 230. In requiring a direct conflict, the Hartford Fire Court gave dispositive weight to 
one of the several comity factors recognized by the Restatement, Timberlane, and 
Brewster. See supra note 65. 
 231. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 79899 ([E]ven assuming that in a proper case a 
court may decline to exercise Sherman Act jurisdiction over foreign 
conduct . . . , international comity would not counsel against exercising jurisdiction in the 
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relied on principles of prescriptive comity to avoid conflict with 
British law.232 
By contrast, in Empagran, all eight voting Justices233 agreed 
that concerns for comity ramifications of overreaching by U.S. 
antitrust courts mandated an interpretation of the FTAIA that 
limited the reach of the U.S. antitrust laws where other nations 
regulatory interests were at stake.234 Despite its paean to comity 
concerns, the Empagran Court did not explicitly cast doubt on 
Hartford Fire.235 
2. The Empagran Exception. Under the Empagran 
plaintiffs second theory, if the FTAIA permitted jurisdiction only 
over claims with a nexus to an effect on domestic U.S. commerce, 
plaintiffs claims might nonetheless be cognizable.236 Plaintiffs 
argued the defendants had been engaged in a worldwide price-
fixing conspiracy, in which all conduct was interdependent on all 
other conduct.237 
                                                          
circumstances alleged here.); see also JOELSON, supra note 10, at 44. 
 232. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 81719 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining prescriptive 
comity as the respect sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their 
laws). 
 233. See F. HoffmannLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 175 (2004) (noting 
that Justice OConnor did not take part in the judgment). 
 234. Id. at 16469 ([I]f Americas antitrust policies could not win their own way in 
the international marketplace for such ideas, Congress, we must assume, would not have 
tried to impose them, in an act of legal imperialism, through legislative fiat.). 
 235. Cf. McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 11617, 11920 (1st Cir. 2005) (relying on 
both Empagran and Hartford Fire). Compare Buxbaum, supra note 227, at 1102 (stating 
that Empagran signals acceptance of the notion that comity operates actually to limit the 
reach of U.S. law to foreign conduct), with Wolfgang Wurmnest, Foreign Private 
Plaintiffs, Global Conspiracies, and the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law, 
28 HASTINGS INTL & COMP. L. REV. 205, 218 (2005) (calling Hartford Fire a near death 
blow to comity), and S. Lynn Diamond, Note, Empagran, the FTAIA and Extraterritorial 
Effects: Guidance to Courts Facing Questions of Antitrust Jurisdiction Still Lacking, 31 
BROOK. J. INTL L. 805, 81415 (2006) (interpreting Hartford Fire to relegate comity 
principles to a circumstance of true conflict between a foreign regime and U.S. law). 
  The importance of comity concerns in extraterritorial commercial regulation has 
received significant scholarly attention. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, A New Dimension in the 
Prosecution of White Collar Crime: Enforcing Extraterritorial Social Harms, 37 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 83, 84 (2006) (arguing that comity concerns should receive more 
attention, with particular attention to the question of the location of the social harm to 
be remedied). 
 236. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 175 (Respondents argue . . . that the foreign injury was 
not independent. Rather, . . . the anticompetitive conducts domestic effects were linked to 
that foreign harm.). 
 237. Respondents contend that, because vitamins are fungible and readily 
transportable, without an adverse domestic effect (i.e., higher prices in the United States), 
the sellers could not have maintained their international price-fixing arrangement and 
respondents would not have suffered their foreign injury. Id. at 175; see also Diamond, 
supra note 235, at 809 (With rampant globalization, instantaneous communication, and 
multinationals building products with components from all over the world and selling 
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The interdependence theory is not new. The concern was 
raised by a witness statement contained in the statutes 
legislative history, but that source does not provide any 
resolution of the interdependence questions.238 In 1985, in de 
Atucha v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that 
[b]ecause of the fungibility of silver and silver futures, the 
United States market . . . and the London Exchange function 
from an economic standpoint as a single market . . . .239 The 
Court rephrased the plaintiffs position thusly: [D]e Atuchas 
theory of standing, as we understand it, is that he may sue under 
American antitrust laws because the defendants manipulation of 
the American silver markets produced his injury on the [London 
Metals Exchange].240 
According to economic theory, in a worldwide conspiracy, 
stable prices in a particular geographic locale are essential to 
avoid cheating, and, therefore, to maintaining stable prices in 
other locales.241 A related concern is that of arbitrage.242 Even 
independent of cheating by participants in the cartel, distributors 
or third parties could take advantage of lower prices in one 
geographic market to move product on their own from a 
competitive market to a fixed-price market.243 That theory is a 
                                                          
them far from where they are produced, it may be argued that there no longer are 
independent, national markets.). 
 238. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 4 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 
2488 (quoting testimony of Professor James A. Rahl, Professor of Law, Northwestern 
University); see also FTAIA Hearings, supra note 99, at 106 (testimony of Martin F. 
Connor, Corporate Counsel, General Electric, on behalf of the Business Roundtable). 
 239. de Atucha v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 510, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(quoting plaintiffs complaint). 
 240. Id. at 513. 
 241. See John M. Connor, Extraterritoriality of the Sherman Act and Deterrence 
of Private International Cartels 910 (Purdue Univ. Dept of Agric. Econ., Staff Paper 
No. 04-08, 2004), available at http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/staff/connor/papers/ 
Extraterritoriality_LR_Version_5-04-04.pdf (noting the likelihood of geographic arbitrage 
in the world market for vitamins at issue in Empagran). See generally BORK, supra note 6, 
at 10204 (describing the incentives that make cheating on cartels likely); Katherine 
Maddox McElroy & John J. Siegfried, The Economics of Price Fixing, in ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW 139, 143, 14546 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried eds., 2d 
ed. 1988) (suggesting conditions required to stabilize cartels); Margaret Levenstein & 
Valerie Y. Suslow, Contemporary International Cartels and Developing Countries: 
Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 801, 819 
n.19 (2004) (collecting and mentioning authorities on the topic); George J. Stigler, A 
Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 44, 4647 (1964) (discussing the theory of 
oligopolies and the difficulties of policing collusion among market participants). 
 242. See Connor, supra note 241, at 910 (observing that geographic displacement 
caused by fluctuating currency rates creates a negative impact on a cartels pricing 
power). 
 243. Id. (providing a thorough analysis of this effect and discussing geographic 
arbitrage and the steps taken by cartels to minimize its effect). 
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likely explanation for the solicitude in the legislative history for 
spillover effects in domestic commerce. 
 The Empagran Court noted that allegations of a world-wide 
conspiracy might be sufficient to conclude the U.S. effect gave 
rise to foreign harm.244 It did not define what sort of 
interdependence of commerce might be sufficient to satisfy the 
gives rise to requirement, stating: The Court of Appeals, 
however, did not address this argument, and, for that reason, 
neither shall we.245 I have previously labeled this exception for 
interdependent commercial activity the Empagran exception. 246 
3. Directness Again: Proximate Cause. On remand from the 
Supreme Courts Empagran opinion (Empagran II), the D.C. 
Circuit adopted a proximate cause analysis to define the 
Empagran exception.247 The court held that the gives rise to 
language indicates a direct causal relationship, that is, 
proximate causation, and is not satisfied by the mere but-for 
nexus the appellants advanced, defining the second directness 
requirement from the statutea rule the plaintiffs had 
conceded.248 After Empagran, the only other court of appeals to 
interpret subsection 2, the Eighth Circuit Court in In re 
Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litigation, followed the D.C. 
Circuits lead. 249  
Those courts interpretations are suspect. The statute lacks 
any requirement of a direct relationship between the effect and the 
plaintiffs claim, as it does for the effects test in subsection 1, and 
the expressio unius canon of construction implies that omission 
                                                          
 244. Throughout the opinion, the Court took great pains to make clear that it based 
its decision on the assumption that the adverse foreign effect is independent of any 
adverse domestic effect. F. HoffmannLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 164 
(2004). 
 245. Id. at 175 (citation omitted). 
 246. See Huffman, supra note 2 (manuscript at 4349). 
 247. Empagran v. F. HoffmannLaRoche, Ltd. (Empagran II), 417 F.3d 1267, 1270
71 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (The statutory languagegives rise toindicates a direct causal 
relationship, that is, proximate causation, and is not satisfied by the mere but-for nexus 
the appellants advanced in their brief.). 
  In OSRecovery, Inc. v. One Groupe Intl, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 357, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005), the district court considered a complaint seeking to apply the RICO statute 
extraterritorially. Despite the absence from the RICO scheme of a statute like the FTAIA, 
the court relied on the effects test from the antitrust scheme to hold that the U.S. effect of 
conduct must directly cause[ ] a foreign plaintiffs loss for the law to apply 
extraterritorially. Id. at 367. 
 248. Empagran II, 417 F.3d at 1271 (expressing the plaintiffs concession regarding 
[t]he statutory languagegives rise to). 
 249. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 477 F.3d 535, 538 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(The appellants contend that we should part ways with the D.C. Circuit. . . . We 
disagree.). 
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has meaning.250 Had Congress meant to include a second 
directness requirement in the FTAIA, it could have required, in 
subsection 2, that such effect directly gives rise to a claim. 
Also, the proximate cause analysis has done little to 
alleviate the uncertainty over the reach of the FTAIA. In 
Empagran II, the causal connection apparently was not 
proximate because two sets of fixed prices were involvedthe 
fixed prices in domestic U.S. commerce that supported price-
fixing in foreign commerce and the fixed prices in foreign 
commerce that actually caused the plaintiffs injury.251 The 
former caused harm in U.S. commerce and, indirectly, the 
plaintiffs harm.252 However, it is not clear what about the alleged 
worldwide price-fixing scheme leads to an indirect and merely 
but-for, rather than a direct and proximate, causal nexus.253 
Indeed, the legislative history seems to hold that the indirect 
effects that occur from spillover of price-fixing in one market into 
another market should be thought sufficiently direct to satisfy 
the FTAIA.254 
C. Types of Crossborder Commerce 
Although at the base level, the distinction between export 
commerce (to which the FTAIA applies), import commerce (to 
which the FTAIA does not apply), domestic commerce (to which 
the FTAIA does not apply), and foreign commerce (to which the 
FTAIA applies) is simple enough, the distinction has created 
some difficulty in courts tasked with determining the reach of 
their authority to hear antitrust claims in crossborder 
situations.255 
                                                          
 250. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable 
effect), with 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) (2000) (gives rise to a claim). National Railroad 
Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974), 
provides a concise definition of this ancient maximexpression unius est exclusion 
alterius. 
 251. Empagran II, 417 F.3d at 1270 ([T]hey were able to sustain super-competitive 
prices abroad only by maintaining super-competitive prices in the United States as 
well.). 
 252. Id. (explaining the appellants theory on the harm and its causation). 
 253. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Empagran v. F. HoffmannLa Roche Ltd., 
126 S. Ct. 1043 (2006). 
 254. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 
2498; OMalley, supra note 102, at 224 ([A] spillover effect in which inflated prices in 
foreign markets would have the effect of raising domestic prices . . . would more than 
likely meet the direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic 
commerce.). 
 255. See JOELSON, supra note 10, at 37 (By its very nature, foreign commerce may 
involve activity abroad, as well as at home. It may encompass acts of U.S. citizens in 
foreign countries and in the United Status, and acts of aliens in the U.S., as well as in 
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Foreign plaintiffs have demonstrated abilities to piggyback 
their claims onto claims that do arise in the type of commerce at 
issue. One example is the situation of foreign plaintiffs who 
export from their home jurisdictions into the U.S. market. By 
claiming harm in import commerce, those plaintiffs seek to 
escape the application of the FTAIA completely.256 For example, 
in Turicentro v. American Airlines Inc., the plaintiffs were 
foreign travel agents who marketed their services to U.S. 
citizens.257 They alleged harm due to the fixing of commissions by 
the airlines in commerce closely related to crossborder trade 
entering the United States, arguing it was import trade or 
commerce and therefore exempt from the application of the 
FTAIA.258 The Third Circuit held that the fact that some U.S. 
purchasers bought services from the foreign plaintiffs was 
immaterial.259 The harm suffered by the foreign plaintiffs was in 
foreign commerce, not import commerce, and the FTAIA 
applied.260 
A different piggybacking attempt was rejected in The In 
Porters v. Hanes Printables, Inc.261 In that case, the plaintiff 
alleged harm felt in export commerce from the United States but 
was not a U.S. exporter within the requirements of the FTAIA.262 
The plaintiff argued, however, that other U.S. exporters were 
harmed because of the defendants conduct, which included 
binding the plaintiff to an exclusive distributorship arrangement 
and preventing plaintiff from purchasing from other U.S. 
                                                          
their own and in third countries.); Cavanagh, supra note 102, at 215972 (describing four 
concrete factual scenarios in which jurisdiccional issues arise); cf. Swift & Co. v. United 
States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905) (Commerce among the states is not a technical legal 
conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business.); TAFT, supra note 
134, at 8082 (emphasizing the practical, rather than formalistic, nature of crossborder 
commerce). 
 256. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000) (stating that the section is not applicable to import 
commerce). 
 257. Turicentro v. Am. Airlines Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 296 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 258. Id. at 30203 (reasoning that because the Sherman Act continues to apply to 
import trade and commerce, the FTAIA is rendered inapplicable to an action alleging an 
impact on import trade or import commerce). 
 259. Id. at 303. 
 260. Id. at 30304 ([The] defendants were not involved in import trade or import 
commerce, but rather were engaged in conduct involving trade or commerce (other than 
import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000)). 
 261. The In Porters v. Hanes Printables, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 494, 495 (M.D.N.C. 
1987). 
 262. Id. at 499. 
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exporters.263 The court held the FTAIA requires an actual injury 
to a plaintiff within the United States.264 
The decision of the Southern District of New York in 
Eskofot A/S v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. deviates from 
Turicentro and The In Porters.265 In Eskofot, the court viewed 
as import commerce actions by a Danish company attempting 
to enter the U.S. market as an exporter from Denmark.266 
Because it was import commerce, the court held that the FTAIA 
did not apply at all.267 
D. Procedural Implications of the FTAIA 
In addition to the substantive questions regarding exactly 
how to define the Empagran exception and the other issues 
presented by the FTAIA, questions remain about the procedural 
posture of each of the FTAIA analyses. Three possibilities include 
treating the FTAIA questions as a matter of a courts subject 
matter jurisdiction, treating it as an element of the substantive 
offense, and treating the FTAIA question as an antitrust 
standing inquiry. The difficulty recalls the procedural confusion 
pre-dating the FTAIA.268 Each issue is raised for both directness 
inquiriesthe statutory inquiry under subsection 1, and the 
Empagran exception under subsection 2. 
1. Substantive Element. The least likely procedural posture 
for the FTAIA analysis is treating it as an element of the 
plaintiffs substantive cause of action. In United Phosphorous, 
Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co., the Seventh Circuit held that the 
FTAIA analysis is not an element of a substantive antitrust 
claim.269 Although United Phosphorus dealt specifically with the 
first FTAIA inquiry, in Metallgesellschaft, the Seventh Circuit 
demonstrated its inclination to treat the subsection 2 question as 
                                                          
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 50001. 
 265. Eskofot A/S v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 872 F. Supp. 81, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995) (describing defendants monopolization efforts in the international market for 
printing equipment and materials). 
 266. Id. at 85. 
 267. Id. (relying on the pre-FTAIA rule in National Bank of Canada v. Interbank 
Card Assn, 666 F.2d 6, 89 (2d Cir. 1981), to determine if the challenged conduct has any 
anticompetitive effect on U.S. commerce). 
 268. See supra notes 4896 and accompanying text (describing the Mannington Mills 
rule and Alcoas test and procedural application). 
 269. United Phosphorous, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 95051 (7th Cir. 
2003) (en banc) ([W]ith reference to FTAIA, the argument that the statute sets out an 
element of the claim or a basis for legislative jurisdiction has not gained approval.). 
(3)HUFFMAN.DOC 4/26/2007 12:47 PM 
330 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [44:2 
part of the analysis under subsection 1.270 The Empagran Court 
did nothing to disturb the United Phosphorus holding or other 
lower-court holdings on which it relied. That failure is not 
dispositive. United Phosphorus was not before the Supreme 
Court, and the sole issue in Empagran was substantive, not 
procedural.271 The Empagran Court left the procedural question 
unaddressed.272 And United Phosphorus was decided over a 
strong dissent by Judge Wood,273 perhaps the federal judiciarys 
foremost thinker on antitrust extraterritoriality issues. Judge 
Wood would have held that the FTAIA inquiry was an element of 
the plaintiffs case-in-chief.274 
Following the element approach might have important 
implications for the manner of pleading and proof required under 
the statute. For example, the section 1 claim typically is thought 
to have two elements: an agreement and a restraint of trade.275 
The FTAIA question would add a third: harm suffered by the 
plaintiff from an effect on domestic commerce.276 Maybe a more 
important implication is the nature of the decisionmaker on the 
FTAIA question. If it is an element of the substantive claim, the 
issue would be presented to the jury at trial, not to the judge at 
an earlier stage of the proceedings.277 That approach would favor 
defendants, if wealth-redistributive impulses of U.S. juries do not 
extend to benefiting foreign plaintiffs.278 
                                                          
 270. Metallgesellschaft A.G. v. Sumitomo Corp., 325 F.3d 836, 83840 (7th Cir. 
2003). 
 271. Empagran v. F. HoffmannLa Roche Ltd., 542 U.S. 155, 15859 (2006). 
 272. Id. 
 273. United Phosphorous, 322 F.3d at 95365 (Wood, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
FTAIA should add an element to an antitrust claim). 
 274. Id. at 95354. Judge Wood identified 
four compelling reasons why we should not construe the FTAIAs test as one 
going to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, and instead should adopt 
what I will call an element approach: first, the language of the statute supports 
the position that this is an element of the claim, especially when it is contrasted 
to true jurisdiction-stripping statutes; second, the subject matter jurisdiction 
characterization is inconsistent with the Supreme Courts decision in Steel Co. 
and with the law of this court; third, the procedural consequences of a subject 
matter jurisdiction reading would have perverse effects, measured against the 
policies the FTAIA and the federal antitrust laws were designed to further; and 
finally, to call this subject matter jurisdiction fails to take into account the long 
history of the application of the U.S. antitrust laws to foreign conduct. 
Id. 
 275. See Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 202 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 276. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)(A) (2000) (proscribing conduct that affects domestic trade 
or commerce). 
 277. See United Phosphorous, 322 F.3d at 963 (Wood, J., dissenting) ([W]hen subject 
matter jurisdiction is contested, . . . the ultimate decision is for the court, not for a jury.). 
 278. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40 ALA. 
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2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Most courts have treated 
the FTAIA analysis as going to the question of the courts subject 
matter jurisdiction.279 In regard to the subsection 1 directness 
inquiry, the subject matter jurisdiction approach probably is the 
correct one. At least one statement in the legislative history 
supports that approach. According to the House Conference 
Report, the FTAIA requires a direct, substantial, and 
reasonable [sic] foreseeable effect on commerce in the United 
States . . . as a jurisdictional threshold for enforcement.280 
Courts inclination might also be based on the historical 
foundation of the effects test, from which the FTAIA is derived.281 
Concentrating on the defendants conduct, the question of direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect is well suited for a 
subject matter jurisdiction analysis. 
On the other hand, even the original Alcoa framework 
evolved, in some courts views, to include a prudential component 
broader than a mere subject matter jurisdiction question,282 and 
Congress explicitly referenced Mannington Mills elsewhere in 
the legislative history.283 The prudential component of the 
Mannington Mills test most appropriately is thought to speak to 
the subsection 2 gives rise to analysis.  
As regards the second question, no compelling arguments 
support treating the inquiry as defining the extent of a courts 
subject matter jurisdiction. The subsection 2 question 
concentrates not on the defendants conduct but on what grounds 
plaintiffs are entitled to suethose whose claims arise from the 
conduct that subsection 1 places within the courts jurisdiction.284 
The Empagran Courts approach to the FTAIA also belies a pure 
reliance on subject matter jurisdiction. Strangely enough, in a 
case that is generally discussed as being about subject matter 
                                                          
L. REV. 975, 99697 (1989) ([T]he antagonism toward large, profit-making institutions is 
likely to be greater in a cross-section of jurors than in a cross-section of the community.). 
 279. See, e.g., United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 94445, 95051 (majority opinion) 
(determining that the FTAIA presents a question of subject matter jurisdiction); 
Empagran v. F. HoffmanLaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 34041 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (stating 
that the courts objective was to interpret the jurisdictional reach of the antitrust laws), 
vacated, 542 U.S. 155 (2004); Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap v. HeereMac VOF (Statoil), 
241 F.3d 420, 42931 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing the subject matter jurisdiction issue). 
 280. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-924, at 2930 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1233, 2490.  
 281. See generally ZWARENSTEYN, supra note 19 (describing the historical 
development of antitrust extraterritoriality and treating the extraterritoriality question 
for all purposes as one of a courts subject matter jurisdiction). 
 282. See supra Part IV.D.3. 
 283. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294 (3d Cir. 
1979); H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 5 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2490. 
 284. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) (2000). 
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jurisdiction, Justice Breyer used the term only once, and that 
was in quoting a treatise.285 Perhaps rather than unflinching 
reliance on the standby of subject matter jurisdiction, the 
question deserves a second look. 
An important implication of treating the FTAIA question as 
speaking to a courts subject matter jurisdiction is the 
nonwaivability of the issue. At any stage of the proceedings, 
including appellate review, the question can be addressed and a 
case, no matter how far it has proceeded, can be dismissed.286 For 
that reason, the subject matter jurisdiction approach gives 
plaintiffs the least certainty possible. 
3. Prudential Standing Inquiry. The third procedural 
approach to the FTAIA inquiries is to treat them as antitrust 
standing inquiries.287 On the subsection 2 question, standing is 
the most likely approach. Interpreting subsection 2, the 
Empagran Court did not mention, let alone discuss or decide, the 
standing arguments decided by the D.C. Circuit, discussed by 
other courts and commentators, pressed by the parties and 
amici.288 The reasons for that failure are unclear.289 Nonetheless, 
good reason exists to understand Justice Breyers opinion in 
Empagran as following the antitrust standing rationale.290 
                                                          
 285. Diamond, supra note 235, at 84041 (arguing the opinion might be read as 
relying on a summary judgment standard). 
 286. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). 
 287. See generally Huffman, supra note 2 (manuscript at 7) (explaining Antitrust 
Standing). 
 288. See Cavanagh, supra note 102, at 143132 (arguing that the Supreme Court 
should have ruled on the standing issue to further develop the law). 
 289. The opinions author, Justice Breyer, has been called the Courts primary 
antitrust thinker. See Huffman, supra note 221, at 514 n.49 (mentioning Justice Breyers 
background in antitrust law). Certainly, if he preferred, he was capable of following the 
antitrust standing argument and applying it. Other members of the Empagran Court had 
written important opinions in standing cases. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of 
Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983) (writing, authored by Justice 
Stevens, an opinion concerning antitrust violations of a collective-bargaining agreement); 
Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 485 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (dissenting 
in opinion concerning antitrust injury arising from health insurance coverage); id. at 492 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (same). 
 290. At oral argument by the government amici in support of petitioners, the 
standing argument received a somewhat ignominious reception. Then-acting Assistant 
Attorney General R. Hewitt Pate argued, with respect to the foreign incurred injuries, 
[the foreign plaintiff] must show injury by reason of that which makes the conduct 
illegal, and since Alcoa in [1945], and certainly under Hartford, it is the effect on U.S. 
commerce that makes the conduct the concern of the Sherman Act . . . . Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 19, F. HoffmannLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004) 
(No. 03-724) [hereinafter Oral Argument], available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts.html. Justice Stevensthe author of Associated 
General Contractors, and an important dissent in Blue Shield of Virginiaqueried in 
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Standing rationale had garnered support leading up to the 
Empagran case. In de Atucha, the plaintiffs lack of antitrust 
standing (having suffered harm through purchasing on a London 
commodity exchange) was the crux of the decision.291 Then, in 
Kruman, the Second Circuit provided a highly defensible 
approach to the FTAIA inquiry that supports treating it as an 
antitrust standing question.292 That court noted the essential 
distinction between the substantive provisions of the U.S. 
antitrust scheme293 and the right of action provisionsincluding 
section 4 of the Clayton Act (Section Four).294 Section Four and its 
requirement that a private plaintiff be injured by reason of a 
violation of the antitrust laws is the textual basis for the 
antitrust standing inquiry.295 The Kruman court held the FTAIA 
permitted jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims, but specifically 
did not address the prudential standing question.296 
There is ample indication in the Kruman district court 
opinion that it would have dismissed plaintiffs claims on 
remand, had the case not settled while the petition for certiorari 
was pending,297 on the grounds of antitrust standing. Judge 
Kaplan observed the distinction on which the Second Circuit 
relied between illegal conduct (governed by subsection 1) and the 
private right to a remedy (governed by subsection 2): 
[I]t is perfectly appropriate for the United States to punish 
the conspiracythe formation and continuation of the illicit 
agreementbecause it took place in substantial part in this 
country. . . . But it would be appropriate for the United 
                                                          
response: I dont follow the [argument]. Oral Argument, supra, at 19 (questioning 
whether Hartford dealt definitively with the issue at hand). 
 291. See de Atucha v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 510, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(holding that the antitrust claims are dismissed for a lack of standing); see also 2 
WALLER, supra note 3, § 13:23, at 13-59 to 13-60 (discussing the de Atucha courts decision 
regarding a lack of standing). 
 292. Kruman v. Christies Intl PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 397403 (2d Cir. 2002), abrogated 
by Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
 293. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000). 
 294. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000). 
 295. See Cavanagh, supra note 102, at 2175 (The substantive provisions of the 
Sherman Act determine what conduct by the defendant is actionable. The Clayton Act 
determines what injury a plaintiff must suffer in order to bring suit. (quoting Kruman, 
284 F.3d at 398)). This distinction was lost on the D.C. Circuit in Empagran. 
 296. Kruman, 284 F.3d at 403 (remanding to the trial court to decide the standing 
issue in the first instance). By contrast, the lower court in Empagran ignored the careful 
distinction in the antitrust laws between the conduct standards and the private right of 
action provision, specifically rejecting arguments that the schemes should be treated 
separately. Empagran v. F. HoffmanLaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 35051 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (calling the structural argument plausible but ultimately unconvincing), vacated, 
542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
 297. See supra notes 199216 and accompanying text. 
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States to provide remedies for injuries suffered in 
consequence of overt acts that occurred outside this country 
only if those acts, either individually or perhaps 
collectively, had direct, substantial and reasonable effects 
here that caused the injuries to be remedied.298 
Judge Kaplan also cited provisions in the legislative history 
of the FTAIA demonstrating the concern for the location of the 
particular plaintiffs injuries and the nexus between the effect 
and the injury.299 The legislative history also demonstrates an 
express intent to preserve the doctrines of antitrust standing and 
antitrust injury.300 
And the Supreme Courts opinion in Empagran is most 
susceptible to a prudential standing interpretation for three 
primary reasons.301 First, the Court relied on California v. 
American Stores Co. to distinguish cases brought by the United 
States from the private suit at issue in Empagran.302 In one 
sense, the distinction is meaningful. As the American Stores 
Court noted, private plaintiffs must have standing . . . in order 
to obtain relief.303 But [i]n a Government case the proof of the 
violation of law may itself establish sufficient public injury to 
warrant relief.304 Thus, the Empagran plaintiffs reliance on 
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, United States v. 
National Lead Co., and American Tobacco Co. as examples of 
                                                          
 298. Kruman v. Christies Intl PLC, 129 F. Supp. 2d 620, 62526 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(internal citation omitted), affd in part, vacated in part, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002), 
abrogated by F. HoffmannLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
 299. See id. at 62425 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 78 (1982), as reprinted in 
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 249297). 
 300. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 11 (stating that conduct which has an 
anticompetitive effect which impinges only on [parties] located in foreign nations and 
which has a neutral or procompetitive domestic effect does not give rise to standing 
under the antitrust laws (quoting Report on Purposes and Provisions of H.R. 5235, A.B.A. 
SEC. OF INTL LAW 9) (emphasis added)). 
 301. This explanation finds support in the treatment of standing in briefing by the 
United States as amicus. The United States argued that the standing question was 
subsumed into the FTAIA. See Brief for the United States & FTC, supra note 195, at 9. 
 302. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 171 (noting that private plaintiffs are far less likely 
to be able to secure broad relief (citing California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 295 
(1990))). 
 303. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. at 296 (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 
U.S. 104, 113 (1986)) (discussing standing in the context of the private injunctive remedy 
under section 16 of the Clayton Act). 
 304. Id. at 295 (citing United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 
316, 31921 (1961)); see also In re Canadian Import Antitrust Litig., 470 F.3d 785, 791 
(8th Cir. 2006) (Unlike a governmental entity . . . a private plaintiff must demonstrate 
that he has suffered an antitrust injury as a result of the alleged conduct of the 
defendants, and that he has standing to pursue a claim under the federal antitrust 
laws.). 
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extraterritorial application of the U.S. antitrust laws before the 
FTAIA was enacted in 1982 was ineffective as to the 
interpretation of the statute.305 American Stores taught that those 
cases did not speak to the standards for extraterritoriality in 
private litigation.306 
But the FTAIA makes no distinction between public and 
private plaintiffs. It applies whether the suit is one by the 
government as a regulator or a private plaintiff seeking 
compensation for harm suffered as a market participant. The 
distinction between public and private enforcement is relevant 
because only the private plaintiff must establish its standing to 
sue. Invoking American Stores demonstrates implicit reliance on 
a prudential standing inquiry. 
Second, the Empagran Court looked to comity considerations 
and first-principles deterrence rationales that are best suited to a 
malleable standing analysis. According to the First Circuit in a 
trademark extraterritoriality case decided in partial reliance on 
the Empagran rule, [c]omity considerations . . . are properly 
treated as questions of whether a court should, in its discretion, 
decline to exercise subject matter jurisdiction that it already 
possesses.307 That understanding of the proper procedural 
treatment of the comity analysis is reminiscent of the 
Mannington Mills approach. 
The same is true for first-principles deterrence rationales. 
Deterrence principles are not found in the text of the FTAIA. 
Congress left to the courts the question whether and how to 
invoke that principle. In the best known deterrence decision, 
Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India,308 the Court invoked the 
private right of action provision, Clayton Act Section Four,309 and 
interpreted the class of plaintiffs with standing to sue to include 
                                                          
 305. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 170 (citing Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 
341 U.S. 593, 595 (1951); United States v. Natl Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 32528 (1947); 
United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 17172 (1911)). 
 306. Id. at 17071 (citing Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. at 295). 
 307. McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 111, 117 (1st Cir. 2005) (Our approach to 
each of these issues is in harmony with the analogous rules for extraterritorial application 
of the antitrust laws. (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 79599 
(1993))). The McBee approach to comity considerations appreciates that comity concerns 
evolve, appear and disappear over time. See Huffman, supra note 2 (manuscript at 41 & 
n.187). That will especially be so as international antitrust standards converge. Cf. 
ZWARENSTEYN, supra note 19, at 99 (no concern for overlapping enforcement if standards 
are uniform). Convergence is occurring in many quarters and promises to continue apace. 
See Kovacic, Extraterritoriality, Institutions, and Convergence in International 
Competition Policy, supra note 99, at 309. 
 308. Pfizer, Inc. v. Govt of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978). 
 309. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000). 
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foreign sovereigns.310 It did not expand the reach of antitrust 
courts subject matter jurisdiction to accomplish that goal.311 In 
Empagran, the Supreme Court relied on an inverse deterrence 
argumentunder which concerns for undermining public 
enforcement efforts both domestically and abroad argued for 
limiting private plaintiff suits to a rational level312that did not 
exist under the extraterritoriality precedents on the books when 
the FTAIA was enacted in 1982.313 
Third, the Empagran Court did not overrule Hartford Fire, 
despite the tension between the approach the Court took in 1993 
of cabining the comity concern narrowly and the current 
approach of elevating comity to a preeminent decision rationale. 
Hartford Fire and Empagran readily coexist if the rule in 
Hartford Fire is understood as a subject matter jurisdiction rule. 
Like Mannington Mills, once the effects test is satisfied, comity 
considerations surface to inform a courts prudential 
consideration whether to exercise its jurisdiction.314 
                                                          
 310. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 320. 
 311. See id., 434 U.S. at 31820. 
 312. See supra notes 196205 and accompanying text (tracing the development of 
standing under FTAIA). 
 313. The U.S. amnesty program on which the inverse deterrence argument is based 
was adopted in 1993, and foreign amnesty programs are more recent yet. See generally 
Ashley Burrowes & John MacDonald, EU Catches Up With US Anti-Trust Legislation, 17 
MANAGERIAL ACCT. J. 593, 593 (2002) (discussing new European Community rules 
offering leniency for decisive information leading to convictions); see also U.S. DEPT OF 
JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (1993), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ 
public/guidelines/0091.pdf (establishing a leniency program for corporations under which 
companies may report activities without concern of criminal sanctions); Huffman, supra 
note 2 (manuscript at 41). 
 314. As the First Circuit recently noted: 
The Hartford Fire Court also held that comity considerations, such as whether 
relief ordered by an American court would conflict with foreign law, were 
properly understood not as questions of whether a United States court possessed 
subject matter jurisdiction, but instead as issues of whether such a court should 
decline to exercise the jurisdiction that it possessed. 
McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 111, 120 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
California, 509 U.S. 764, 79798 & n.24 (1993)). [C]omity considerations are properly 
analyzed not as questions of whether there is subject matter jurisdiction, but as 
prudential questions of whether that jurisdiction should be exercised. Id. at 121; see also 
Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799 (We have no need in this litigation to address other 
considerations that might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction on 
grounds of international comity.). 
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IV. CURRENT AND FUTURE ISSUES IN FTAIA LITIGATION 
A. Issues Left to Be Litigated 
1. Definition of Gives Rise to a Claim. Courts and 
commentators have not settled on a clear and broadly applicable 
approach to interpreting the Empagran exception. According to 
Professor Waller, a leading commentator on antitrust 
extraterritoriality, after Empagran, important questions remain 
as what circumstances, if any, foreign antitrust plaintiffs 
suffering injury abroad can bring their claims to U.S. courts. 
Years of additional litigation or statutory change will be 
necessary to definitively resolve this critical question.315 
Certainly, with Empagran definitively putting a stop to claims of 
independent foreign harm, future claims will seek to exploit the 
Empagran exception.316 
Other than the Empagran II court on remand, the only 
circuit to address the Empagran exception is the Eighth Circuit, 
which, affirming the District of Minnesota in In re Monosodium 
Glutamate Antitrust Litigation, followed the D.C. Circuits 
approach, holding gives rise to in the FTAIAs subsection 2 
meant proximate, not but-for cause.317 Like the Empagran II 
court, the Eighth Circuit viewed foreign effects from a price-
fixing scheme as distinct from domestic effects; if the domestic 
effects of price fixing were its direct or proximate result, the 
foreign effects were indirect and attenuated.318 
Several district courts have followed the D.C. Circuits lead 
and have engaged in a proximate cause inquiry. The results, 
though, have proved to be unpredictable. In Latino Quimica-
Amtex S.A. v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals B.V., plaintiffs alleged that 
unlawful price fixing and market allocation conduct had 
adverse effects in the United States and in other nations that 
caused injury to Plaintiffs in connection with their foreign MCAA 
                                                          
 315. See 1 WALLER, supra note 3, § 13:23, at 13-62 to -63 (predicting that the 
Supreme Court will grant certiorari further to clarify the issue). 
 316. See, e.g., Houston & Pratt, supra note 9, at 27 (It is questionable whether the 
decision of the Court of Appeals in Empagran [II] will put significant constraints on 
Canadian purchasers who wish to bring their claims in the United States. In most 
international cartel cases which involve Canada, the allegation is a North American 
conspiracy, not separate conspiracies relating to Canada and the United States.).  
 317. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 477 F.3d 535, 538 (8th Cir. 2007) 
([G]ives rise to language requires a direct or proximate causal relationship . . . . (citing 
Empagran S.A. v. F. HoffmannLaRoche, Ltd. (Empagran II), 417 F.3d 1267, 1271 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005))). 
 318. Id. at 538. 
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purchases.319 Those claims did not state a proximate causal 
connection to an effect in U.S. commerce.320 
In eMag Solutions LLC v. Toda Kogyo Corp., plaintiffs 
claims also relied on arbitrage allegations, but in that case the 
plaintiffs specifically alleged they were prepared to engage in 
arbitrage to end-run fixed prices, but fixed prices in domestic 
U.S. commerce prevented their doing so.321 Nonetheless, the 
allegations did not state a proximate causal connection.322 
By contrast with those cases, a district court in Connecticut 
held that allegations raising the same arbitrage concern as the 
worldwide conspiracy allegations in Empagran were sufficient to 
meet the Empagran exception.323 Plaintiffs alleged the defendants 
sought to ensure that prices charged by [the] [p]laintiffs to end-
users in India for [p]roducts would not cause erosion to prices in 
the United States.324 There is no apparent legally significant 
distinction between the allegations the District of Connecticut 
rejected and the allegations held elsewhere not to meet the 
Empagran exception.325  
                                                          
 319. Latino Quimica-Amtex v. Akzo Nobel Chem. B.V., No. 03 Civ. 10312(HBDF), 
2005 WL 2207017, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2005) (quoting the complaint). 
 320. Other allegations stated that [d]efendants and their co-conspirators illegal 
contract, combination and conspiracy to harm U.S. and world commerce directly injured 
[the] Plaintiffs. Id. at *9 (quoting the complaint); see also In re Dynamic Random Access 
Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., Nos. C 02-1486 PJH, C 05-3026 PJH, 2006 WL 515629, 
at *45 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2006) (holding that allegations of a worldwide conspiracy 
[w]ithout more . . . constitute no more than the but for causation that the Empagran 
cases find objectionable). 
 321. eMag Solutions LLC v. Toda Kogyo Corp., No. C 02-1611 PJH, 2005 WL 
1712084, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2005). Plaintiffs would have been particularly well-
suited to replace purchases . . . in purely foreign commerce with purchases . . . in 
American commerce, if the conspiracy had not affected the prices . . . in American 
commerce. Id. at *4 (quoting the third-amended complaint). 
 322. Id. at *7. 
 323. MM Global Servs., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 329 F. Supp. 2d 337, 342 (D. Conn. 
2004) (holding that an allegation of foreign injuries may both arise from and give rise to 
effects on domestic commerce). 
 324. Id. at 340 (alterations in original) (quoting the amended complaint). 
 325. The only allegation that may distinguish MM Global from Empagran is that the 
MM Global plaintiffs alleged that [a]s a direct and proximate result of the defendants 
conduct, harm occurred. Id. at 342 (quoting the amended complaint). An allegation that 
something was the proximate cause is an allegation of a legal conclusion, not of fact. See 
Latino Quimica-Amtex v. Akzo Nobel Chem. B.V., No. 03 Civ. 10312(HBDF), 2005 WL 
2207017, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2005) (Without the factual predicate to support these 
allegations, however, they cannot be read to plead the requisite causal link between the 
conspiracys domestic effect and Plaintiffs foreign claim. (citing Hirsch v. Arthur 
Anderson & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1088, 1092 (2d Cir. 1995))). But the proximate cause 
allegations in MM Global did not relate to a connection between an effect on U.S. 
commerce and harm in India, as most courts understanding of the Empagran exception 
requires. The complaint alleged merely the harm felt in India was the result of such 
effect on competition in the United States. MM Global, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 342 (emphasis 
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A district court in Minnesota initially interpreted the 
Empagran exception consistently with the District of 
Connecticut.326 Foreign plaintiffs allegations of a worldwide 
conspiracy to fix the prices of fungible, globally marketed 
products survived a motion to dismiss.327 But in light of 
Empagran II, the court later reconsidered its holding.328 It was 
persuaded by the decision and reasoning of the District of 
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Empagran II.329 The court 
held on reconsideration a worldwide conspiracy allegation 
established at best but-for, not proximate, cause, and that 
Empagran II required the latter.330 The second In re Monosodium 
Glutamate Antitrust Litigation (In re MSG) opinion was affirmed 
by the Eighth Circuit, also following Empagran II.331 
Thus, although I previously have argued the state of 
authority since Empagran is confused,332 the great weight of 
authority follows a strict proximate cause inquiry and dismisses 
all claims by foreign plaintiffs claiming their harm is derivative 
of a domestic effect. Only the MM Global decision is to the 
contrary. But only two courts of appeals have addressed the 
issue, and Empagran itself clearly did not foreclose all suits by 
plaintiffs alleging their harm was felt in foreign commerce. 
Considering also the indeterminacy of the question of proximate 
cause and the recognition in the FTAIAs legislative history that 
directness can be a function of magnitude and staying power of 
an effect, there must be room for claims of foreign harm that is 
interdependent with a domestic effect to be heard in U.S. courts. 
This issue remains far from settled. 
2. Viability of the Timberlane Rule Post-FTAIA. A related 
question is whether the Timberlane rule has retained vitality 
with the passage of the FTAIA. Under Timberlane and the Third 
                                                          
in original) (quoting the amended complaint). But see eMag Solutions, 2005 WL 1712084, 
at *7 (The district court in MM Global never discussed whether but-for causation is the 
appropriate standard [and noted that] the case did not concern purely foreign 
commerce . . . .). 
 326. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., No. Civ. 00MDL1328, 2005 WL 
2810682 (D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2005), affd, 477 F.3d 535 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 327. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., No. Civ. 00MDL1328, 2005 WL 
1080790 (D. Minn. May 2, 2005), revd 2005 WL 2810682, affd, 477 F.3d 535 (8th Cir. 
2007). 
 328. Monosodium Glutamate, 2005 WL 2810682, at *1.  
 329. Id. at *3. 
 330. Id. 
 331. See In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 477 F.3d 535, 53940 (8th 
Cir. 2007). 
 332. See Huffman, supra note 2 (manuscript at 65). 
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Circuits substantively analogous Mannington Mills decision, a 
comity analysis similar to that set out in section 403 of the Third 
Restatement of Foreign Relations was either part of, or followed, 
the jurisdictional inquiry under Alcoa.333 The FTAIA explicitly 
adopted a version of the effects test in subsection 1.334 The 
legislative history reflects awareness and approval of the 
Timberlane/Mannington Mills approach.335 But there is no 
indication in the text of the statute whether an appropriate place 
exists for a comity-based inquiry. 
The Supreme Court in Empagran answered that question in 
part, relying on comity principles in interpreting subsection 2 to 
limit the class of plaintiffs permitted to sue in a U.S. antitrust 
court to those plaintiffs claiming harm as a result of an effect in 
U.S. commerce.336 But the Court denounced reliance on case-by-
case analysis of comity principles, at least as regards claims by 
plaintiffs suffering independent foreign harm.337 The Court 
preferred to state a bright-line rule barring all claims by 
plaintiffs who suffered harm in wholly foreign commerce.338 
Courts should recognize the Timberlane comity analysis remains 
available to inform the standing question for those claims that 
are interdependent with a U.S. effect.339 
3. Whether There Is Room in Modern Extraterritoriality 
Analysis for a Conduct Test. The emphasis in antitrust 
extraterritoriality since Alcoa has been on the location of the 
injurynot the conducta deviation from early decisions like 
American Banana, which looked primarily to the location of the 
conduct causing the harm.340 The FTAIA adopted the Alcoa 
effects approach in subsection 1s direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable formulation341largely, I have argued, 
                                                          
 333. See supra notes 6287 and accompanying text. 
 334. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2000). 
 335. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993) (noting a 
House Report that reserved to courts power to use comity principles); see also JOELSON, 
supra note 10, at 42 ([T]he legislators included language in the House Committee Report 
to the effect that courts were still free to employ notions of comity . . . or 
otherwise . . . take account of the international character of the transaction. (omissions 
in original)). 
 336. See F. HoffmannLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 16869 (2004). 
 337. Id. at 168. 
 338. Id. (noting that the case-by-case approach is too complex to prove workable). 
 339. See Huffman, supra note 2 (manuscript at 43) (discussing the approval of 
Timberlane in Empagran). 
 340. See supra notes 3738 and accompanying text. 
 341. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2000). 
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for protectionist purposes.342 Congress and the courts seemingly 
have abandoned, in the antitrust realm, the concern for exporting 
bad effects that underlies Judge Friendlys opinion in Bersch v. 
Drexel Firestone, Inc.343 dealing with issues of extraterritoriality 
under the securities laws. In Bersch, Judge Friendly opined that 
Congress did not mean the United States to be used as a base 
for fraudulent securities schemes even when the victims are 
foreigners . . . .344 
Concentrating wholly on the location of the effects and 
ignoring the location of the conduct reflects a willingness to 
export harm, so long as there is no harm in domestic commerce.345 
The best textual example in the FTAIA is the limitation on suits 
over injury suffered in export commerce to those brought by U.S. 
exporters.346 And the legislative history specifically endorses the 
reading some have made of Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., that claims of conduct with pro-competitive 
or neutral impact at home, but anticompetitive effect abroad, are 
not cognizable under the U.S. antitrust laws.347 
4. The Application of the FTAIA to Antitrust Claims Based 
on Conduct Other Than Cartel Activity. Most modern FTAIA 
cases arise in the context of price-fixing claims. The application 
of the statute is much less developed in the context of other 
claims such as, for example, unilateral monopolization claims 
under section 2 of the Sherman Act. One recent case applying the 
FTAIA in the context of a section 2 claim is the District of 
Delawares decision adding another chapter to two chip-making 
giants lengthy antitrust battle taking place in multiple forums. 
The court held in In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust 
Litigation that claims by plaintiff manufacturers who operated 
only in Germany, alleging exclusionary conduct by a U.S.-based 
worldwide computer chip manufacturer precluded plaintiffs 
succeeding in competition in foreign markets, were not permitted 
                                                          
 342. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 343. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 n.24 (2d Cir. 1975) (Any 
fraudulent misrepresentations were neither made nor relied on in the United States.). 
 344. Id. at 987. 
 345. See Wood, supra note 10, at xiv. 
 346. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)(B) (2000). 
 347. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 58284 
(1986) (Respondents cannot recover antitrust damages based solely on an alleged 
cartelization of the Japanese market, because American antitrust laws do not regulate 
the competitive conditions of other nations economies.). 
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in U.S. court, despite allegations of a world-wide price-fixing 
conspiracy.348 
The Intel court employed both directness inquiries under the 
FTAIA.349 First, it held the effect on U.S. commerce was not 
direct, despite plaintiffs allegations that it is an American 
company engaged in a world-wide market.350 Second, despite 
allegations that plaintiffs harm was inextricably bound up with 
domestic restraints of trade, the court held the effect on U.S. 
commerce did not directly give rise to the plaintiffs claim.351 
Although the court was not persuaded in Intel, when the 
plaintiff is itself a multinational company with business in a 
variety of jurisdictions, it is even more difficult to separate 
foreign effects from domestic effects. In Intel, the defendants 
ability to prevent the plaintiff from competing on a world-wide 
scale certainly contributes to the plaintiffs success maintaining 
or establishing a monopoly position in domestic commerce. The 
Intel court saw these as ripple effects.352 If they achieve a 
certain magnitude, however, they should be considered much 
more. It is not difficult to imagineespecially in a world in which 
electronics manufacturing occurs largely in foreign commerce
that monopolizing foreign commerce can be dispositive of efforts 
to compete domestically.353 
B. Reform Efforts 
Reform efforts are under way. The Antitrust Modernization 
Committee (AMC), a twelve-member organization with members 
appointed by the President, U.S. Senate, and U.S. House of 
Representatives, was charged by Congress in the Antitrust 
Modernization Committee Act of 2002 with 
1. [examining] whether the need exists to modernize 
the antitrust laws and to identify and study related 
issues; 
                                                          
 348. In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 452 F. Supp. 2d 555, 561 (D. 
Del. 2006). 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Also, although a domestic plaintiff purchasing in a foreign market may not be 
suffering harm due to a domestic effect, if that same plaintiff is purchasing an input for 
use in a domestic manufacturing operation, the situation might be different. But see 
Liamuiga Tours v. Travel Impressions, Ltd., 617 F. Supp. 920, 92223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(finding no jurisdictional nexus where claims involved entirely lost business and 
anticompetitive effects in St. Kitts, despite arguments that the effect is to increase prices 
to U.S. purchasers seeking to travel to St. Kitts). 
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2. [soliciting] views of all parties concerned with the 
operation of the antitrust laws; 
3. [evaluating] the advisability of proposals and 
current arrangements with respect to any issues so 
identified; and 
4. [preparing] and . . . submit[ting] to Congress and 
the President a report . . . . 
[which] contain[s] a detailed statement of the findings and 
conclusions of the Commission, together with 
recommendations for legislative or administrative action 
the Commission considers to be appropriate.354 
The AMC includes as a member John Shenefield, former 
head of the Antitrust Division at the Department of Justice, the 
chair of a prior commission studying the antitrust laws during 
the 1970s,355 and an important witness in the hearings leading up 
to the enactment of the FTAIA. Makan Delrahim, at the time of 
the Supreme Courts Empagran decision, the Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General in charge of international antitrust matters at 
the Antitrust Division,356 and in that capacity a signatory on the 
brief of the United States filed at the Supreme Court in the 
Empagran case, is also a commissioner.357 
In its final Report and Recommendations, issued in early 
April, the AMC considered possible reforms to the FTAIA
namely, the first four [i]nternational [i]ssues [r]ecommended for 
[c]ommission [s]tudy in a memorandum from 2004, the year the 
AMC began its work.358 The proposals for reform considered by 
the AMC have included (1) doing nothing and letting the common 
law process sort out remaining issuesan approach I previously 
have suggested,359 (2) doing nothing except recommending courts 
follow the District of Columbia Circuits lead in interpreting the 
FTAIAan efficient approach if one is sympathetic to the 
proximate cause inquiry the Empagran II court adopted, given 
                                                          
 354. Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 
§§ 11053, 11058, 116 Stat. 1856, 1856, 1859, quoted in Antitrust Modernization Commn, 
About the Commission, http://www.amc.gov/about_commission.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 
2007). 
 355.  See AMC REPORT, supra note 3, app. 67. 
 356. See Antitrust Modernization Commn, Commissioner & Commissioner Staff 
Bios, http://www.amc.gov/bios.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2007). 
 357. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, F. 
HoffmannLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2003/3mer/1ami/2003-0724.mer.ami.pdf.  
 358. Memorandum from the Intl Working Group to Commrs, Antitrust Modernization 
Commn, 1, 2 (Dec. 21, 2004), available at http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/ 
International.pdf.  
 359. See Huffman, supra note 2 (manuscript at 65). 
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the apparent inclination of courts to do that on their own,360 or 
(3) recommending a redraft of the FTAIA.361 In the final Report 
and Recommendation, eleven of the twelve commissioners 
announced a general principle as to the interpretation of the 
FTAIA that it believed fairly represents the intent of Congress 
in enacting the FTAIA, is consistent with the Supreme Courts 
holding in Empagran, and describes how court decisions should 
apply the FTAIA.362 As a general principle, purchases made 
outside the United States from a seller outside the United States 
should not be deemed to give rise to the requisite effects under 
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act.363 Makan 
Delrahim did not join the recommendation.364 
 The eleven commissioners who did join were split nearly 
evenly on whether to recommend an amendment to the FTAIA, 
or simply to encourage courts to produce this result as a matter 
of the statutes common-law development.365 The AMC Report 
recognized that most courts, including one other federal court of 
appeals, have followed Empagran II.366 Although the AMC Report 
did not propose language for a possible amendment, various 
suggested amendments were considered before the AMC Report 
was completed. One example of an amended FTAIA the AMC 
considered reads as follows: 
(1) Sections 1 through 7 of this title shall not apply to 
conduct occurring outside the United States unless such 
conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect on: 
  (a) commerce within the United States; 
  (b) import commerce with foreign nations; or 
  (c) export commerce with foreign nations. 
(2) Any person who suffers a direct and proximate injury as 
a result of such effect may bring an action under Sections 1 
through 7 of this title. Any person who makes a purchase 
outside the United States from a seller outside the United 
States shall be deemed not to have suffered injury as a 
result of such effect. 
                                                          
 360. See supra Part V.A.1. 
 361. See Antitrust Modernization Commn, Supplemental International Antitrust 
Discussion Outline 1 (Dec. 1, 2006), [hereinafter AMC Outline] available at 
http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/061201_Intl-FTAIA3dSuppOutline.pdf. 
 362. AMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 228 & n.*. 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id. Unfortunately, in his separate statement, Delrahim did not explain his 
reasons for not joining. 
 365. Id. 
 366. See id. at 228 & n.128 (citing cases including In re Monosodium Glutamate 
Antitrust Litig. (MSG), 477 F.3d 535 (8th Cir. 2007)). 
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(3) If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to conduct only 
because of the operation of paragraph (1)(c), then only the 
United States may bring an action under Sections 1 
through 7 of this title.367 
The Languagewhich, if somewhat overwrought, at least 
has the virtue of clarity that the FTAIA lackslikely was 
abandoned in the final report because it goes far beyond the 
general principle on which eleven commissioners did agree.  
Through the operation of subsection 3, the proposed language 
would have removed any right of action by U.S. exporters for 
harm suffered in export commerce. 368 The amendment also sets in 
stone the strictest possible reading of the D.C. Circuits 
Empagran II decisioneffectively the result reached by the 
Northern District of California in eMag Solutions. 369 Subsection 2 
forecloses in unambiguous terms any suit claiming harm suffered 
in foreign commerce, no matter how direct or proximate the 
connection between a domestic effect and the claimed foreign 
harm. 370 
Amendments to the FTAIA should be avoided as almost 
certainly ineffective at accomplishing their intended result and 
possibly deleterious to the worthy goal of respect[ing] 
appropriate jurisdictional boundaries.371 An important lesson 
from the original enactment of the FTAIAwhich, though 
intended to limit U.S. antitrust courts extraterritorial reach, was 
interpreted by at least two Federal Courts of Appeals to expand 
the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. antitrust lawsis that 
efforts to reduce common-law principles to statute in this arena 
                                                          
 367. AMC Outline, supra note 361, at 1. 
 368. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 6a (exporters may sue for harm in export commerce). 
 369. See eMag Solutions LLC v. Toda Kogyo Corp., No. C 02-1611 PJH, 2005 WL 
1712084, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2005) (noting that plaintiffs could have purchased the 
rest of their [requirements] from the U.S. market had it remained competitive). 
 370. Compare In re MSG, 477 F.3d 535, 539540 (finding that direct and proximate 
result of a domestic effect would permit a claim under the FTAIA). 
 371. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMN, AMC REPORT: INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 6 (Jan. 10, 2007) (preliminary draft outline), available at http://www.amc.gov/ 
pdf/meetings/Rep-ExecSum_070110circ.pdf. The common-law approach to extraterritoriality 
would have the effect of permitting greater extraterritorial application as world-wide 
standards for antitrust enforcement converge. See Kovacic, Extraterritoriality, 
Institutions, and Convergence in International Competition Policy, supra note 99, at 309; 
cf. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993) (holding that 
extraterritorial application is permissible if there is no conflict in legal schema); 
ZWARENSTEYN, supra note 19, at 99 ([T]here is no reason why the prerogative of a 
particular State to regulating conduct within its borders should be exclusive when 
dealing with judicial jurisdiction. In a world of close cooperation and similar views with 
regard to law enforcement it would be quite conceivable that a violation committed in one 
State would be adjudicated in another State. (footnote omitted)). 
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can produce perverse results.372 Certainly the commission was 
wise to abandon the most recent proposed amendment, the 
language quoted above. The language would have overruled a 
part of the Supreme Courts holding in Empagran and would 
have gone too far by unambiguously foreclosing any possibility 
that an injury both suffered and inflicted overseas could be 
adjudicated in a U.S. antitrust court, even if there was an 
immediate nexus between that injury and an effect in U.S. 
commerce.373 
 The eMag Solutions rule and the suggested amendments to 
the FTAIA threaten substantial under-deterrence. In 
circumstances in which suits by domestic plaintiffs cannot be 
expected to sufficiently deter anticompetitive behavior in 
domestic commerce, sufficient deterrence can be achieved by 
permitting suits by foreign plaintiffs who suffer harm 
inseparable from the effect on U.S. commerce. [A]n exclusion of 
all foreign plaintiffs would lessen the deterrent effect of treble 
damages.374 The proposed amendment the commission 
abandoned would have derogated from a worthy principle the 
commission advances elsewherethat of minimiz[ing] 
overdeterrence and underdeterrence.375 
V. CONCLUSION 
 The FTAIA was born of the tri-partite desires to protect 
American exporters, to introduce clarity into the law governing 
extraterritorial application of the U.S. antitrust laws, and to 
mitigate diplomatic conflict with foreign trading partners. 
Progress on those fronts has been made. But little proof exists 
the FTAIA is a necessary, or sufficient, tool for achieving that 
progress. It is likely that the comity-driven approach from 
Timberlane, amending as it did the controversial Alcoa effects 
test, would have accomplished the third goalmitigating 
diplomatic conflictjust as well as has the statute. The second 
goal, introducing clarity, has not been realized. In those areas 
                                                          
 372. Cf. TAFT, supra note 134, at 13133 (arguing against amendments to the 
Sherman Act, which became the Clayton Act of 1914, because of the sufficient clarity 
provided by the common-law development under the law). 
 373. See MM Global Servs., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 329 F. Supp. 2d 337, 342 (D. 
Conn. 2004) (rejecting Dow Chemicals assertion that it is impossible for the plaintiffs to 
allege both that the injuries gave rise to domestic affects on commerce and that domestic 
effects also gave rise to their injuries). 
 374. Pfizer, Inc. v. Govt of India, 434 U.S. 308, 315 (1978); see also Huffman, supra 
note 2 (manuscript at 5758) (discussing Pfizer and the ability of extraterritorial violators 
avoiding legal authority (quoting Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 315)). 
 375. AMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 90. 
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where clarity exists, it is because of extraterritoriality standards 
that effectively eliminate any role for foreign plaintiffs in 
enforcing the U.S. antitrust laws. That is a clear standard, to be 
sure, but it is much broader than any Congress intended to 
impose under the FTAIA. 
 But there is no indication the FTAIA will be amended or 
repealed. The AMC Report fortunately failed to make such a 
recommendationthe proposed amendment crafted during 
deliberations on the final report was awkwardly worded and 
achieved clarity only through absolutism. As is the tradition with 
antitrust analysis, then, the development of extraterritoriality 
principles remains in the hands of common-law courts. Much 
room for clarification remains. 
